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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040371-CA

v.
RICKIE L. REBER,
TEX WILLIAM ATKINS, &
STEVEN PAUL THUNEHORST,
Defendants/Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of aiding
or assisting in wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third
degree felony (R. 2-3).1

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where the state established that the crime was committed

in Uintah County, did the trial court commit reversible error in
allocating to defendant the burden of proving that he was Indian,
in order to except himself from state jurisdiction?

1

This appeal represents the consolidation of three cases,
each involving a single defendant. See Order of Consolidation at
addendum A. All transcript and record citations will be to the
Reber case materials. For purposes of linguistic flow, the state
employs the singular, "defendant," rather than the plural.

2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant,

who initially claimed to be a Timpanogos Tribe Indian but later
asserted that he was a Uintah Band member of the Indians of Utah
Territory, was not legally Indian and was, therefore, subject to
state jurisdiction?
Trial court jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 55,

11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)).
3.

Did the trial court properly reject mistake of law as a

defense to aiding in the destruction of protected wildlife where
the oral testimony defendant sought to introduce did not fit
within the parameters of the mistake statute and the written
opinions were not relevant to the crime charged?
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court ruling
below.

State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992), overruled

on other grounds, State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah
2003); State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, 56, 57 P.3d 1134.
4.

Where defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge

was not timely filed, where he offered no good cause for delay,
and where, in any event, he inadequately briefed the issue on
appeal, can he prevail on his claim that he was prejudiced by the
trial court's alleged bias?

-2-

This Court declines to consider issues that are not properly
presented for appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App

135, 58, 47 P.3d 107 (court declines to consider argument that is
inadequately briefed); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 531, 973 P.2d
404 (court declines to consider issue where party fails to engage
in meaningful analysis of legal authority).
"Determining whether a trial judge committed error by
failing to recuse himself . . . under the Utah Code of Judicial
Conduct, rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and our
accompanying case law is a question of law, and we review such
questions for correctness."

State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979

(Utah 1998) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties
for wanton destruction of protected wildlife, provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction
of protected wildlife if that person:
(a) commits an act in violation of . . .
Section 23-20-3(1). . . and
(c)(i) does so with intentional, knowing, or
reckless conduct . . .

(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable:
(a) as a third degree felony if:

(ii) a trophy animal was captured,
injured, or destroyed.

-3-

Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in this title or a
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife
Board, a person may not:

(a) take. . .
(i) protected wildlife or their parts. . .
(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or
their parts. . . or
(d) possess protected wildlife . . .
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit,
[or] tag . . .
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is
prima facie evidence that the protected
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally
held in possession.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23

(West 2004), governing aiding or

assisting, provides:
It is unlawful for any person to aid or
assist any other person to violate any
provisions of this code or any rules or
regulations promulgated under it. The
penalty for violating this section is the
same as for the provision or regulation for
which aid or assistance is given.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304

(West 2004), governing mistake o

fact or law, provides in pertinent part:

(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable
mental state is a defense to any prosecution
for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the
existence or meaning of a penal law is no
defense to a crime unless:

-4-

(a) Due to his ignorance or
mistake, the actor reasonably
believed his conduct did not
constitute an offense; and
(b) His ignorance or mistake
resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of
the law contained in a written
order or grant of permission by an
administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question;
or
(ii) A written interpretation
of the law contained in an opinion
of a court of record or made by a
public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the
law in question.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of aiding or assisting
in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree
felony (R. 2-3).

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction (R. 12-13).

After extensive briefing and hearings

on jurisdiction and subsidiary issues related to jurisdiction,
the court denied the motion (R. 359-64 at addendum B ) .

Defendant

was then tried by a jury, which convicted him as charged (R. 50506, 564). The court ordered a suspended prison term of zero-tofive years, restitution of $4000, a fine of either $1250 or 250
hours of community service, and three years of probation with
conditions attached (R. 562-65 at addendum C ) .
timely notice of appeal (R. 566-67).

-5-

Defendant filed a

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint
in Uintah County where the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
was checking for chronic wasting disease (R. 584: 157).

There

was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but no permit,
license, or tag attached to the animal (Id. at 158).

Defendant

and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in the truck
(Id. at 162).
Defendant told a conservation officer that his son had shot
the deer but that he felt responsible for the act (Id. at 164,
167).

The son corroborated that he had killed the deer (Id. at

165).

The conservation officer testified that defendant had

blood on his hands, and defendant's brother testified that
defendant had helped load the deer into the truck (Id. at 165,
180) .
Based on this evidence, defendant was charged with aiding or
assisting in the wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 2-3).

The

crime was charged as a third degree felony because the animal was
a trophy deer, statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside
antler measurement of 24 inches or greater." Utah Code Ann. § 2313-2(46) (a) (West 2004).

The parties stipulated to the size of

the antler spread (R. 584: 165-66).
pre-trial motions.

Defendant filed numerous

After the motions had been briefed, heard,

and denied, defendant stood trial, and a jury convicted him as
charged (R. 584: 211).

Defendant filed a timely appeal, seeking

-6-

review of the trial court's pretrial rulings (R. 566-67).

This

Court consolidated defendant's appeal with two other appeals
raising identical issues (Order of Consolidation at addendum A ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has organized his lengthy appellate brief into
three issues and six sub-issues, with 22 additional sub-parts
included within the sub-issues, and two sub-sub-parts.
of Aplt. at 1-5.

See Br.

In the interests of efficiency and clarity, the

state has reframed defendant's claims.
First, the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant
must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in order to
defeat state court jurisdiction.

Once the state established that

the crime occurred in Uintah County, it had carried its burden of
establishing jurisdiction.

The burden then shifted to defendant

to demonstrate an exception by showing a particular reason why
the federal courts should assume jurisdiction instead.
Second, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant was
not Indian for the purpose of establishing an exception to state
criminal jurisdiction.

Where defendant conceded that the crime

occurred in Uintah County and where defendant did not adduce
evidence that would invoke the federal government's interest in
the special relationship it maintains with certain Indian people,
the state properly retained jurisdiction.

Nothing about

defendant's assertion that he is a Uintah Band member of the

-7-

Indians of Utah Territory or about the effect of the Utah
Partition Act changes this result.
Third, the trial court correctly refused to allow several
witnesses to testify about defendant's alleged mistake of law in
relying on two Tenth Circuit opinions for the belief that he was
excepted from the law forbidding hunting without a state permit.
This issue is not only inadequately briefed but also is based on
a constitutional ground that was not ruled upon in the trial
court.
it.

For these reasons, the Court may decline to even consider

Even so, the argument fails because defendant seeks to

introduce oral testimonial evidence that is precluded by the
plain language of the statute governing mistake.

And, apart from

the testimonial evidence, the two cases on which defendant
purportedly relied were not relevant.

Consequently, any reliance

on them would have been unreasonable.
Finally, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the
trial court's bias.

Presumably, this argument addresses the

denial of his motion to disqualify Judge Payne.

Because the

issue is inadequately briefed, this Court should decline to
consider it.

In any event, because the motion was untimely and

unsupported with any good cause for the eleven-month delay in
filing it, the trial court properly denied it.
ARGUMENT
The central issue defendant raises in his appellate brief is
jurisdictional in nature.

The law is well-settled that subject

-8-

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or
the Court.

State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992).

Plainly, "when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist,
neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that
void."

Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)

(citation omitted).

This appeal focuses almost entirely on

jurisdictional issues raised in pre-trial motions, hearings, and
orders, all of which concluded that the district court had
jurisdiction.

Notably, the substantive issue at trial, whether

defendant aided or assisted in the wanton destruction of
wildlife, is not at issue on appeal.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT DEFENDANT MUST CARRY THE
BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING HIS INDIAN
STATUS; IN ANY EVENT, BECAUSE THE
PARTIES STIPULATED TO THE FACTS
ESTABLISHING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT
INDIAN FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION, ANY ERROR IN THE
COURT'S ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF
PROOF WAS HARMLESS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that
he must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in order to
defeat state court jurisdiction.
260 at addendum D.

See Br. of Aplt. at 60; R. 265-

Defendant's argument lacks merit.

The trial court reached a correct legal conclusion.

While

the state bore the initial burden of proving that the crime was
committed in Utah, once it established that fact, the burden then

-9-

shifted to defendant to establish that he fit within an exception
that would preclude the state from exercising jurisdiction.
The issue of who bears the burden of proving that a
defendant or a victim is either Indian or non-Indian has been a
source of some debate among the federal circuits.

Although

courts disagree about who bears the burden of proving a defendant
is not Indian, they nonetheless seem to agree that, in order to
invoke federal jurisdiction for a crime committed in Indian
Country, the federal government must at least establish that
the defendant or the victim is Indian.2

either

Compare United

States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2001) (federal
government must prove the Indian/non-Indian status of both the
defendant and the victim because this status will "determin[e]
whether a federal court has jurisdiction" and under what statute
jurisdiction is derived); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449,
457 (7th Cir. 1984)(government must prove not only that
defendants are Indian but also that victim was non-Indian) with
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir.
2005)(federal government must prove the Indian status of either
defendant or victim, but need not prove non-Indian status of
either); United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
1983)(government need not allege non-Indian status of defendant

2

For a definition of "Indian Country," see 18. U.S.C.
§1151 at addendum E.
-10-

in an indictment under section 1152 and does not have burden of
going forward on that issue).
Under Utah law, it is clear that the state bears the burden
of establishing the trial court's jurisdiction over a defendant.
See generally State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah App.
1988)(in proving offense of consumption, state bore burden of
establishing jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was
consumed in Utah; failure to do so required reversal); see also
Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422-24 (Utah 1997)
(when faced with defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, state bore burden of establishing jurisdiction
under specific guidelines).
To establish a state trial court's authority to hear a case,
the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that some element of the charged offense was committed in Utah.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (West 2004) (listing the various
methods by which a crime may be committed "wholly or partly
within the state," thereby subjecting the actor to state court
jurisdiction); see also State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah
1995) (applying preponderance standard to jurisdictional
questions, which must be decided by trial court rather than
jury).

If the state, then, shows by a preponderance of the

evidence that the offense was committed in Utah, it has met its
burden with regard to jurisdiction.

In this case, the trial

court found that the crime was committed in Uintah County, and
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defense counsel conceded that "we don't have evidence that it
didn't happen within Uintah County" (R. 584: 193).
Once the state establishes its jurisdiction, the burden
shifts to defendant to prove circumstances that would deny the
court of jurisdiction.

This view is buttressed by case law.

In

State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "[defendant] carried his

burden

of factually

establishing that he has been ^recognized racially' as a Ute
Indian."

Id. at 933 (emphasis added).

In discussing the burden

of proof in the instant case, the trial court correctly
recognized the import of Perank by stating: "Given the fact that
the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and
that it is the opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound
to follow that decision."3 (R. 263 at addendum D) .
The legislative history of Utah's jurisdiction statute
further bolsters the correctness of Perank's statement that the
defendant must prove that he qualifies for an exception to
jurisdiction.

Recognizing that the case law on this issue has

been less than clear, the legislature recently amended the

3

This Court has ruled inconsistently on the issue. In
State v. Haqen, this Court cited Sorenson and held that "the
prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that
defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of
evidence." 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on
other ground). In contrast, three years earlier, another panel
held that "[defendant] had the burden to persuade the trial court
that he was an ^Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1152-1153." State v. Lucero, No. 860213-CA (Utah App. Aug.
27, 1987) (unpublished memorandum decision at addendum F). The
correctness of Haqen is undermined by Perank, cited above.
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jurisdictional statute to "clarif[y] procedures for challenging
the state's jurisdiction to prosecute an offense."
General Session (2004) (enacted).

S.B. 119,

Under the amended statute,

once the state
establish[es] jurisdiction over the offense .
. . by showing . . . that the offense was
committed either wholly or partly within the
borders of the state, . . . the burden is
upon the defendant to prove, [that] defendant
is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe . .
. and that the facts establish that the crime
is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or
federal court.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5) (West 2004).

While the statute was

amended after the present case arose, the legislature made clear
that its intent was to "clarify" the law rather than change its
essential nature.
Indeed, when the legislature adds a clarifying provision to
a statute, that provision generally takes retroactive effect.
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988)("[w]hen a
statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended
statute") overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 150-51
(Utah 1979); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d
208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (a statute or amendment that "deals only
with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have
been understood prior to its enactment" applies retroactively).
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on defendant comports
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with the rule adopted in other states that have addressed the
issue.

See Arizona v. Verduqo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1995) ("we hold that the burden to show facts that would
establish the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, because of
exclusive federal jurisdiction under [§§ 1152 or 1153], is on
defendant, not the state"); Pendleton v. Nevada, 734 P.2d 693,
695 (Nev. 1987) ("[o]nce the state produces evidence that the
crime took place in the county, it is incumbent upon the
defendant to prove that the incident took place on lands over
which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction"); New Mexico
v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) ("[tjhe burden
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the
district court"); Oklahoma v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1989) (disagreeing with defendant's argument that "he
has no affirmative duty to prove his status as an Indian" in
attempting to defeat state jurisdiction); Vermont v. St. Francis,
563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) (holding that defendant has "the
burden of proving they are Indians"); Washington v. Daniels, 16
P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("person claiming to be
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction must show (1) that
he is an Indian in the racial sense, and (2) that he is enrolled
or affiliated with a [federally-recognized tribe] and is
individually subject to United States jurisdiction").
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred
in finding that defendant must carry the burden of proving his
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Indian status, the error was harmless.

"^Harmless' errors are

^errors which . . . are sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings.'"

State v. Hamilton/

827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989)).
Here, the parties stipulated to the facts regarding
defendant's Indian status claim. (R. 580: 16-21, 23; R. 265 at
addendum D ) . Among other things, the parties stipulated that
defendant was 15/16 non-Indian by blood, that he was not a member
of any federally-recognized tribe, and that he had not lived in
Indian Country for the last 29 years.

Id.

Thus, even if the

trial court erred in ruling that defendant must carry the burden
of proof, that alleged error would have made no difference to the
determination that he did not legally qualify as Indian.
Point Two, infra.

See

Consequently, any error in allocating the

burden of proof was harmless.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT DEFENDANT, WHO INITIALLY
CLAIMED TO BE A TIMPANOGOS TRIBE
INDIAN BUT LATER ASSERTED THAT HE
WAS AN INDIAN OF UTAH TERRITORY,
WAS NOT LEGALLY INDIAN AND WAS,
THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO STATE
JURISDICTION
Defendant's jurisdictional argument is multi-faceted and
complex.

Reducing the argument to its simplest terms, he asserts

that because he is Indian and the crime was committed in Indian
-15-

Country, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction over his case.
Jurisdiction over hunting and fishing in Indian Country, he
contends, rests exclusively with the federal government.

See Br.

of Aplt. at 23-25.4
The crime here was committed in Uintah County on land that
was within the original boundaries of the Uncompahgre
Reservation and is "Indian Country."

See R. 584: 191 (trial

court oral ruling on location of crime); 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(defining Indian Country) at addendum E; Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1518 & 1530 (10th Cir. 1997), cert,
denied sub nom, Duchesne County v. Ute Indian Tribe, 522 U.S.
1107 (1998) (holding that the decision in Hacren v. Utah, 510 U.S.
399 (1994) did not require the court to recall its prior
determination in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d
1087, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), that all lands within
the Uncompahgre Reservation "retained their reservation status
and remained Indian Country, subject to the jurisdiction of the
Tribe and the federal government.").

Because the land on which

the crime occurred was Indian Country, the pivotal inquiry for
purposes of determining jurisdiction is whether defendant meets

4

This claim is incorrect ab initio. An Indian who is
charged with a criminal hunting violation may be subject to
tribal and/or federal jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4);
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 534
U.S. 1115 (2001) (Indian tribes have inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
Defendant's erroneous assertion, however, is peripheral because
defendant is not an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.
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the legal definition of Indian.

If he fails to qualify as

"Indian," then the state properly exercised jurisdiction.
The Court may find the following chart useful in
understanding how jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country is allocated:
Crimes by Parties

Jurisdiction

1. By Indians against Indians:

2.

a.

"Major" crimes

Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)

b.

Other crimes

Tribal (exclusive)

By Indians against non-Indians:
a.

"Major" crimes

b.

Other crimes

Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)
Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)

3.

By Indians without Victims:

Tribal (exclusive)

4.

By non-Indians against Indians:

Federal (exclusive)

5.

By non-Indians against non-Indians: State (exclusive)

6.

By non-Indians without Victims:

State (exclusive)

Canby, William, American Indian Law, 168 (3d ed. 1998).
Underlying all determinations of jurisdiction for crimes
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian
tribes.

That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique

status of Indians as ^a separate people' with their own political
institutions.

Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is

governance of once-sovereign political communities."
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
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United

Thus, " w , in

dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has
assumed special responsibilities."'"

LaPier v. McCormick, 986

F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)).
The federal government assumes these "special
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances.

For

example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian,
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction.5
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D.
1988) (citing D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 41215 (2d ed. 1986)).

The state, in turn, exercises criminal

jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when
Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility,
are absent.

See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against nonIndians "is based on the fact that ^such crimes do not involve

5

Defendant also tries to bootstrap into federal
jurisdiction by asserting that the "victim" of his crime was the
Ute Tribe. See Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. Defendant, however, has
no standing to assert rights on the Tribe's behalf. Murdock, 132
F.3d at 542.
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essential tribal relations or affect the rights of
Indians'") (citation omitted).
A.

Defendant is not Indian for purposes of determining if the
state properly exercised jurisdiction in this case.
The dispositive jurisdictional inquiry for a crime committed

in Indian Country begins with whether defendant meets the legal
definition of "Indian."6

If he does, then federal interests are

implicated and the state is precluded from exercising
jurisdiction.
For purposes of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed
in Indian Country, the genesis of a test for determining whether
either a perpetrator or a victim is Indian was first articulated
in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846).

Through

subsequent state and federal court rulings, this analysis has
evolved into a two-part test:
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can
be found that [a defendant or victim] is
Indian under federal law. Initially, it must
appear that he has a significant percentage
of Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant]
must be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or by some tribe or
society of Indians." Goforth v. State, 644
P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 1982).
State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 n.2, (Utah App. 1990), reversed
on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992); accord Perank, 858

6

The matter is inherently complex because the definition
of "Indian" may vary, depending on the context for which identity
as an Indian is relevant. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d at 927, 932
n.6 (Utah 1992) (citing Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 19-20 (1982)).
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P.2d at 932.

This test has been used by many courts, both

federal and state.

See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 273

F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d
758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th
Cir. 1995); United State v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.
1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D.
1988); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 23-27 (Conn. 1997); State
v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990); State v. Attebery, 519
P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (ID
Ct. App. 1988).
In this case, the parties stipulated and the trial court
found that defendant carried 1/16 Ute Indian blood from his
mother and no Indian blood from his father (R. 265 at addendum D;
R. 362 at addendum B ) .

In assessing what quantum of Indian blood

satisfies the first prong of the Rogers test, most courts require
at least 1/4 Indian blood.

Venzia v. United States, 245 F. 411

(8th Cir. 1917)(1/4 to 3/8 found sufficient); State v. LaPier, 790
P.2d at 986-87 (165/512 found sufficient); State v. Haaen, 802
P.2d at 747 (5/16 found sufficient); Makah Indian Tribe v.
Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (Wash. 1968) (1/4 found
sufficient); cf. Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982) (slightly less than 1/4 found insufficient).

Courts

have differed on whether l/8th Indian blood is sufficient to
satisfy the first Rogers prong.

Compare Sully v. United States,
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195 F.113, 117, 129 (8th Cir. 1912) (1/8 held sufficient) with
Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77,80 (Wyo. 1982) (1/8 held
insufficient).

The State could find no cases holding that 1/16

Indian blood constitutes a "significant amount" of Indian blood
sufficient to fulfill the first prong of the Rogers test.

Under

the first prong of Rogers, then, defendant does not carry a
sufficient quantum of Indian blood to qualify as an Indian for
purposes of invoking a federal interest in criminal jurisdiction.
The analysis need not go further.

Defendant is not an

Indian under the accepted legal standard and the state,
consequently, has jurisdiction over his crime even though it
occurred in Indian Country.

An examination of the second Rogers

prong, while not necessary, further demonstrates how far
defendant is from qualifying as Indian for federal jurisdictional
purposes.
The second prong of the Rogers test, focusing not on race
but on recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal
government, was comprehensively analyzed in St. Cloud v. United
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456.

There, the court examined "whether

the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a
formerly sovereign people."

St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.

Reviewing existing case law, the St. Cloud court gleaned four
factors to analyze:
In declining order of importance, these
factors are: 1) enrollment in a tribe; 2)
government recognition formally and
informally through providing the person
-21-

assistance reserved only to
enjoying benefits of tribal
4) social recognition as an
living on a reservation and
Indian social life.
Id. at 1461.

Indians; 3)
affiliation; and
Indian through
participating in

These factors, the court noted, are intended not to

establish "a precise formula," but rather to "guide the analysis
of whether a person is recognized as an Indian."

Id.

As to the first factor, enrollment in a tribe, defendant's
claims have shifted.

He initially asserted that he was "a member

of the Timpanogos Tribe[,] . . .

a sovereign tribe whose

existence pre-dates that of the United States" (R. 35). Months
later, in another memorandum, defendant fashioned himself a
"Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory"(R. 128), omitting any further
claim of membership in the Timpanogos Tribe.

In yet another

memorandum, defendant calls himself a Uintah Band member of the
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory (R. 166-68) .

While defendant

asserts membership in these various entities, he has not adduced
proof of being an enrolled member of any tribe, nor has he
adduced any proof that the groups in which he asserts membership
are, indeed, tribal entities.

Defendant has thus failed to

establish that he is "enrolled in a tribe" for purposes of
fulfilling the second prong of the Rogers test.
Second, no evidence was adduced that the federal government
ever recognized defendant as Indian by providing him with
benefits or services reserved only for Indians.
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Third, the only record evidence that defendant benefitted
from tribal affiliation of any sort was that his minor son
possessed a Timpanogos Tribe hunting permit when they were
apprehended with the trophy buck in their truck (R. 75). While
at that time defendant and his son may have claimed an
association with the Timpanogos Tribe, defendant has since
abandoned any claim of such affiliation (R. 126, 128, 166-68).7
The final factor is defendant's social recognition as an
Indian, including such considerations as living on a reservation
and participating in an Indian social lifestyle.

The record is

undisputed and the trial court found that defendant, age 51, had
not lived on or near an Indian reservation for nearly 30 years
(R. 265 at addendum D, R. 363 at addendum B).
The record before this Court, then, does not support either
prong of the Rogers test.

The trial court thus correctly

concluded that defendant was not Indian for purposes of federal
jurisdiction (R. 360-62 at addendum B).

Accordingly, the state

properly exercised jurisdiction over his case.

7

And, indeed, such a claim would get him no further than
his current claim. See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, case no.
2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) (holding that
Timpanogos Tribe has no legal identity separate and apart from
Ute Tribe) at addendum G.
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B.

Defendant's claimed affiliation as a Uintah Band member of
the Indians of Utah Territory does not provide him with an
independent, aboriginal right to hunt free from state,
tribal or federal jurisdiction.
Defendant eschews the Rogers test, claiming instead that,

based upon his purported membership in the Uintah Band of the
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, he possesses an aboriginal
right to hunt, unregulated, in Indian Country.

The Uintah Band,

he claims, while eventually incorporating with two other bands to
become the Ute Indian Tribe, retained all the rights it formerly
possessed as a separate Shoshone Band (R. 165-66).

Defendant

concludes that his right to hunt thus predates the existence of
the Ute Tribe and exists wholly apart from the Ute Tribe, coming
as it does from his Shoshone ancestors who were Uintah Band
members.

See Br. of Aplt. at 35-39.

Defendant's argument was unequivocally rejected by the
federal courts in United States v. Murdock, 919 F.Supp. 1534 (D.
Utah 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied,
Murdock v. United States, 525 U.S. 810 (1998).

In that case,

Perry Murdock, the son of two "mixed-bloods" terminated from the
Ute Indian Tribe under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677a
et seq., claimed the right to hunt and fish on the Reservation
because he was a member of the Uintah Band.
F.Supp at 1540-42; 132 F.3d at 540-41.

See Murdock, 919

In affirming the district

court's holding that Murdock did not retain aboriginal hunting
and fishing rights through the Uintah Band, the Tenth Circuit
held:
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The [Ute Tribe's] Constitution thus makes
clear that the Bands ceased to exist
separately outside the Ute Tribe, that
jurisdiction over what was formerly the
territory of the Uintah Band was to be
exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the
rights formerly vested in the Uintah Band
were to be defined by the Ute Constitution
and exercised by the Ute Tribe. In light of
these provisions, [Murdock's] argument that
the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing rights
retain a separate existence and belong only
to the Uintah Band is groundless. Even if
[Murdock] is correct that the Uintah Band
continues to maintain its own identity, under
the Ute Constitution the Band does so only
within the context of the Ute Tribe.
Accordingly, [Murdock] has no right of user
in hunting and fishing rights originally
granted to the Uintah Tribe.
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541; cf. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, case
no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) at addendum G
(citing favorably the testimony of two experts who concluded
"that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that
presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos
Tribe, . . . and that the Timpanogos, other than as members of
the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation").
Defendant's claim, based on his membership as a Uintah Band
Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory, is similarly groundless.
Where the Uintah Band was formally incorporated into the Ute
Tribe, hunting and fishing rights originally accorded Uintah Band
members no longer retain a separate existence from the Ute Tribe.
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541.

Defendant's claim of a separate

hunting right premised upon the Uintah Band's retained aboriginal

-25-

rights thus fails for the same reasons Murdock's identical claim
failed before the federal courts.
C.

The Ute Partition Act (UPA) is relevant only insofar as
defendant claims a right to hunt and fish deriving from his
mother's status as a mixed-blood Ute whose name appeared on
the mixed-blood roll.
Defendant contends that he is a Uintah Band member of the

Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, not a Ute Indian, and that
the Ute Partition Act is irrelevant, an analytical "red herring"
to the merits of his case (Br. of Aplt. at 42). 8 Nonetheless, he
relies on the UPA to assert that he has an interest in Ute tribal

8

Defendant also claims that the UPA is unconstitutional
because it violates the equal protection clause. See Br. of
Aplt. at 56-59. Defendant, however, failed to argue this issue
at trial, and the court, accordingly, did not rule on it.
Defendant has, therefore, waived consideration of the
constitutional issue on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. Webb, 790
P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts "generally will not
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellant
raises on appeal for the first time"). Moreover, defendant has
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances,
the two recognized exceptions to the waiver doctrine. See State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 & n.3 (Utah 1993); State v.
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989). In any event, the constitutional
issues related to the UPA have been raised and rejected in the
federal courts. See, e.g., Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541-42.
Moreover, defendant argues that his due process rights were
violated. See Br. of Aplt. at 59-73 (asserting due process
violations in trial court's allocation of burden of proof, in
trial court's determination that mistake of law did not apply,
and in trial court's alleged bias). While due process was
tangentially referenced in defendant's briefing to the trial
court, the court did not frame its rulings in constitutional
terms, and defendant never invoked rulings on the constitutional
issues. See R. 260-65 at addendum D (burden of proof); R. 319-23
at addendum H (mistake of law); R. 295 at addendum I (judicial
bias). Accordingly, these issues are waived as well. State v.
Richins, 2004 UT 36, 5 8, 86 P.3d 759.
-26-

hunting and fishing rights (Id. at 42-47) .

In essence, defendant

seeks simultaneously to disassociate himself from the Ute Tribe
and, at the same time, to interpret provisions of the Ute
Partition Act, which applied to those persons who were members of
the Tribe when the UPA was passed in 1954, to his own benefit.
He cannot have it both ways.

At its crux, defendant's argument

fails because the right to hunt is a personal right and is
limited to mixed-blood Utes whose names appeared on the
termination roll.

Defendant has no claim to those rights under

any circumstances.
Some context for defendant's claim is necessary.

When

Congress enacted the Ute Partition Act in 1954, it divided the
Ute Tribe into two groups: "full-blood members" and "mixed-blood
members."9

Subsequently, a list of the mixed-blood members of the

Ute Tribe was published in the Federal Register.

United States

v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1985).

This list came

to be known as the mixed-blood roll.10

The Ute Partition Act

stated that, when the roll was published, "^the tribe shall
thereafter consist exclusively of full-blood members.

9

Mixed-

"Full-blood members" had one-half degree of Ute blood and
a total Indian blood of more than one-half. United States v.
Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1985). "Mixed-blood
members" had insufficient Ute or Indian blood to qualify as fullblood members or they met the full-blood standards but elected to
be treated as mixed-blood members. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C.
§677a(b), (c).
10

The list is also sometimes referred to as the
"termination roll."
-27-

blood members shall have no interest therein except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter.' 25 U.S.C. §677d."

Id.

Considering

the language of the UPA, this Court has noted: "By terminating
federal control over ^mixed-blood' Utes, Congress expressly
transferred jurisdiction over them to state courts."
Gardner, 827 P.2d 980, 981 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

Defendant's mother

was a "mixed-blood" and was terminated in accordance with the
terms of the UPA (R. 265 at addendum D ) .
The net effect of the UPA, finalized in 1961, was to end
exclusive federal supervision of mixed-blood members and to give
these terminated Ute tribal members complete control over their
proportionate share of interest in all tribal assets that could
practically and equitably be distributed.

Felter, 752 F.2d at

1507 (citing 25 U.S.C. §677o (a)). Those assets not susceptible
to such distribution were to be jointly managed by the Ute Tribe
and authorized representatives of the terminated or mixed-blood
Utes.

United States v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (D. Utah

1982). aff'd 752 F.2d 1505. n
The UPA did not specifically address hunting and fishing
rights.

In 1982, however, the federal district court held that

11

The mixed-bloods' authorized representative, the Ute
Distribution Corporation (UDC), manages these assets. See 25
U.S.C. § 677i; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972). Originally, the stockholders in the UDC were the 490
mixed-bloods. Today, less than 160 original mixed-bloods
continue to own shares in the UDC. See Hackford v. Babbitt, 14
F.3d 1457, 1463 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994). UDC stock is "freely
transferable." IcL. at 1462.
April 25, 2005
-28-

Oranna Felter, a former member of the Ute Tribe who was listed on
the mixed-blood roll, retained her personal right as a former
tribal member to hunt and fish on the Reservation.
v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002.

United States

The court refused to construe

silence in the UPA as an abrogation of the mixed-blood rights to
hunt and fish on the reservation.

Id. at 1017-18 (citing

Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
The court recognized that

NX

[t]he right of user in tribal hunting

and fishing rights that Oranna B. Felter and the other mixedbloods possessed as tribal members was a personal

right.

It was

neither alienable, assignable, transferable nor descendible."
Id. at 1023 (emphasis added). 12

Moreover, the right of user,

whether exercised by a tribal member or a mixed-blood, was
subject to regulation by the Ute Tribe, id. at 1024 & n.47, 1025,
and

12

The Tenth Circuit in Felter identified the right to hunt
and fish as "an asset not susceptible to equitable and
practicable distribution" within the meaning of the UPA. 752
F.2d at 1514; see 25 U.S.C. § 677o(a). However, it was an
indivisible right of a different sort than the rights managed by
the UDC. The right to hunt and fish was a personal right of
user, derived directly from the mixed-bloods' former membership
in the Ute Tribe, but not represented by stock ownership in the
UDC. Each of the original 4 90 mixed-bloods whose names appeared
on the mixed-blood roll personally retained the right but, unlike
the indivisible assets managed by the UDC, this right was not in
any way transferable. Moreover, when each holder of the right
died, "so did his or her personal right of user." Felter, 546 F.
Supp. at 1025 (footnote and citation omitted). Through
attrition, then, the mixed-blood right to hunt and fish is slowly
extinguished, thus completing the process of termination.
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[i]ndividual mixed-blood Utes enrolled upon
the final mixed—blood Roll (and still living)
are thus entitled to hunting and fishing
privileges within the Ute reservation
equivalent to those afforded members of the
tribe as now defined. As each of the mixedblood Utes passes away, his or her personal
right of user is extinguished, it being
neither inheritable or transferable.

Recalling that the thrust of termination was
to end federal supervision of Indian assets,
not to extinguish the Indians' rights without
just compensation, the continuing right of
user concept accomplishes that end without
incurring inequities, administrative
complications, or liability under the Fifth
Amendment.
Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1025 (footnote omitted).
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 538-39.

See also

A mixed-blood Ute whose name

appeared on the mixed-blood roll, then, could continue to hunt
and fish during his/her lifetime.
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that defendant's
mother was a mixed-blood Ute and that her name appeared on the
mixed-blood roll (R. 265 at addendum D ) .

Consequently, despite

termination, she nonetheless retained the personal right of user
to hunt and fish on the reservation during her lifetime.
e.g,, Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509.

See

That right, however, was not

transferable or inheritable by her son, the defendant in this
case:
The children of persons listed
blood roll would not enjoy the
had by their parents. If they
exercise any such tribal right

-30-

on the mixedentitlement
are to
that may occur

only through direct affiliation with the
tribe as members.
Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1025, n.52 (citing F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 185 (1942 ed.); accord Murdock, 132 F.2d at
540.

The trial court in this case reflected the essence of the

Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Felter when it observed: "The Court
does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors
[sic] status as Indian only to continue that relationship with
their descendants'' (R. 361 at addendum B) .

With respect to

tribal hunting rights, the court properly ruled that hunting
rights enjoyed by defendant's mother, a mixed-blood Ute, did not
pass to her son, who never enjoyed Ute tribal membership.13
See Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509.
While defendant claims no association with the Ute Tribe, it
is only through Ute tribal membership that the UPA would be
applicable to him.

Even then, however, he would not retain any

hunting or fishing rights because he is the son of a terminated

13

In a further contortion of the UPA, its purposes, and
its application by the courts, defendant maintains that because
he was born at the time of termination but was not listed on the
mixed-blood roll, nothing in the UPA applied to him. See Br. of
App. at 51-54). The absence of defendant's name from the
termination roll is, as the court noted, wholly irrelevant,
reflecting as it does the undisputed facts that "at the time of
the termination act, [defendant was] not [an] enrolled member of
the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could
receive tribal benefits. Because [he was] not [a] tribal
member[. . . he] could not have been listed on the termination
proclamation" (R. 361 at addendum B ) . Plainly, defendant could
not be terminated from a status he never sought or enjoyed.
-31-

Ute and the personal right of user to hunt and fish, while
enjoyed by his mother, could not be passed down to him.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
MISTAKE OF LAW AS A DEFENSE TO
AIDING IN THE DESTRUCTION OF
PROTECTED WILDLIFE WHERE THE ORAL
TESTIMONY DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO
INTRODUCE DID NOT FIT WITHIN THE
PARAMETERS OF THE STATUTE GOVERNING
MISTAKE AND THE WRITTEN OPINIONS
WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE CRIME
CHARGED
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it rejected
his mistake-of-law defense and, consequently, refused to allow
several witnesses to testify in support of what he claimed was
his reasonable but mistaken belief that he could hunt without a
state permit.14

See Br. of Aplt. at 65-72.

14

In ruling on defendant's request, the trial court cited
three rationales offered by defendant during pre-trial
proceedings to justify his assertion that he could hunt without a
state permit:
1) Because he is a descendant of a terminated
Ute and has inherited hunting privileges from
his mother; or
2) Because he was alive at the time that the
Termination Proclamation was issued and was
not listed on the proclamation; and therefore
has maintained rights to hunt; or
3) Because he is an aboriginal Indian of Utah
Territory who retains aboriginal hunting
rights.
R. 322 at addendum H. These rationales had all been rejected by
the court in previous rulings. Id.
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This argument fails at the outset for wholly inadequate
briefing.

Nowhere in his appellate brief does defendant

articulate the precise nature of the mistake he claims he made or
exactly how the mistake-of-law doctrine specifically applies to
the facts.

The law is well-settled that "to permit meaningful

appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing
requirements sufficiently to ^enable us to understand . . . what
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those
errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those
errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other
relief.'" Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App.
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah
App. 1988)).

Defendant's argument fails because he has not

explained the asserted error in sufficient detail to enable this
Court to clearly understand its essential nature.
A further difficulty with defendant's appellate brief is
that he has framed his appellate argument as a due process claim.
See Br. of Aplt. at 59-60, 65-67.

The trial court's ruling,

however, is not based on constitutional grounds.

Rather, the

ruling interprets the statute governing mistake, reviews
pertinent case law, and applies rules 401 and 402 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

See R. 319-23 at addendum H.

The trial court

did not rule on constitutional grounds, and there is no
constitutional ruling from which to appeal.
2004 UT App 36 at 28.
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State v. Richins,

To the extent that the state has successfully gleaned the
meaning of defendant's mistake-of-law argument, it fails.
Defendant seems to assert that the trial court's rulings that he
was not Indian and that jurisdiction properly rested with the
state "established that the Defendants' reliance on [two] 10th
Circuit rulings constituted a ^mistake'" of law, triggering the
applicability of mistake as an affirmative defense to the charge
of aiding in the destruction of protected wildlife.
Aplt. at 65-66 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304).

See Br. of
To support

his defense, defendant sought to introduce the oral testimony of
the federal appellate court judges who authored the opinions on
which defendant allegedly relied; two law professors; the Uintah
County Attorney; the Chief Executive Officers of the Timpanogos
Tribe; and members of the Uintah Band, the Uncompahgre Band, and
an Indian of Utah Territory.

See Br. of Aplt. at 68-69; R. 323

at addendum H.
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons: first, because
he sought to establish a mistake-of-law defense by introducing
oral testimony that did not fit within the parameters of the
statute governing mistake; and, second, because the two Tenth
Circuit cases on which he relies are legally irrelevant.
First, as to the oral testimony he sought to introduce, the
statute governing mistake of law provides that the mistake must
result from reasonable reliance on "a written interpretation of
the law contained in an opinion of a court of record" or on "[a]n
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official [written] statement of the law . . . by an
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question."
304(2) (b) (i)-(ii).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

The plain language of the law makes no

provision for the oral legal interpretations of either the
written opinion's authoring judges or of law professors or for
the general oral opinions of tribal representatives who have not
been charged with any responsibility for interpreting state law
governing the taking of protected wildlife.

See State v. Norton,

2003 UT App 88, 1 13, 67 P.3d 1050 ("The language of section 762-304 clearly and unambiguously requires a written
interpretation, by either a court of record or a public servant,
in order for mistake of law to be an available defense").
Because the oral testimony of defendant's proposed witnesses did
not fall within the plain language of the law governing mistake,
the court properly excluded it.

See R. 319 at addendum H.

Second, defendant purported to rely on two Tenth Circuit
cases, Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002),
and Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997).
Given the procedural posture and holdings of these cases,
however, they were legally irrelevant.

Consequently, any

reliance on them would have been patently unreasonable.
Timpanogos Tribe was an interlocutory appeal from the denial
of the state's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b) (6), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

286 F.3d at 1198.
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In that context, a

panel of the Tenth Circuit determined that the Timpanogos Tribe
"may establish federal question jurisdiction in asserting its
hunting rights" even though it was not a federally recognized
tribe.15

Id. at 1203-04.

This ruling merely permitted the suit

to continue; the court granted no other relief at that time.
at 1203-04.

Id.

Defense counsel, intimately familiar with Conway

because he served as counsel on the case, fails to explain how or
why a ruling on a motion to dismiss caused him to reasonably
believe that he was exempt from state law forbidding hunting
without a state permit.

That issue had plainly not been

litigated when Conway was issued.16
Ute Indian Tribe, the other case on which defendant purports
to rely, addresses the boundaries of the Uintah Valley Indian
Reservation, attempting to resolve a conflict raised by a United
States Supreme Court decision that conflicted with an earlier
Tenth Circuit decision.
1513.

See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d

In this case, the trial court was never asked to rule on

15

A "federally recognized tribe" is an Indian tribe
recognized by the United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, as an Indian entity. The most recently
published list of federally recognized Indian tribes is found at
68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003).
—
16

Subsequently, the federal district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, noting expert testimony
that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes and now have no rights
on the Reservation other than as Ute tribal members, and holding
that the Timpanogos have no legally cognizable aboriginal right
to hunt and fish on land reserved for the Ute Indians.
See addendum G at 1-2, 11.
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any boundary issue, and there is no boundary issue currently
before the Court in this appeal.17
Defendant has inadequately briefed the issue of mistake of
law for appellate review.

Moreover, he seeks to establish his

defense by relying on oral testimony outside the parameters of
the mistake statute and on written opinions that do not support
the propositions he asserts, much less the reasonable reliance he
claims.

For these reasons, the trial court did not err in

refusing to allow him to adduce evidence of mistake of law.
POINT FOUR
DEFENDANT'S UNSUPPORTED CLAIM THAT
HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL
COURT'S BIAS SHOULD BE REJECTED NOT
ONLY FOR INADEQUATE BRIEFING BUT
ALSO BECAUSE THE MOTION ON WHICH HE
BASES HIS APPELLATE CLAIM WAS
UNTIMELY
Defendant argues that the trial court was biased against him
throughout the jurisdictional proceedings, as evidenced by the
court's consistently adverse rulings.

Br. of Aplt. at 72-73.

Indeed, he asserts, the court evidenced a "clear bias against all
Indians of Utah Territory." Id. at 73.

For this reason,

defendant moved in district court to disqualify Judge Payne,
supporting his motion with four affidavits.

17

R. 277, 280-92.

His

The parties agreed that the deer was taken in Uintah
County, in Indian Country. The location was within the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in the southern
portion that was previously the Uncompahgre Reservation. It is
about 30 miles from the current Uintah Valley Reservation. R.
83-84.
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appellate argument, presumably, is his response to the trial
court's denial of his motion.

See R. 295 at addendum I.

Defendant's argument fails at the outset for inadequate
briefing.

It nowhere cites to the trial court's ruling or

explains why that ruling is incorrect.
73.

See Br. of Aplt. at 72-

Defendant baldly asserts prejudice, relying only on the fact

that the trial court ruled against him.

Moreover, he fails to

support his argument, such as it is, with substantial legal
authority.

Indeed, it is "devoid of any 'meaningful analysis.'"

State v, Marcruez, 2002 UT App 127, 1 10,54 P. 3d 637 (citation
omitted).

The law is well-established that Utah appellate courts

decline to consider claims where defendant has failed to offer
any meaningful legal analysis.

See, e.g.. State v. Thomas, 1999

UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 531, 973
P.2d 404; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (articulating
briefing requirements).
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim, he
would fare no better.

Here, the trial court certified

defendant's motion to the presiding judge of the district for
review, as mandated by rule 29(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

R. 293.

Rule 29(c)(3)(A) provides: "If the reviewing

judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed
in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall
assign another judge to the action. . .."
29(c)(3)(A) (West 2004)(emphasis added).
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Utah R. Crim. P.
According to the plain

language of the statute, all three requirements must be met
before the reviewing judge can reassign the case.

The absence of

any one requirement is fatal to the motion.
Here, the reviewing court examined the pleadings, determined
that the motion was not timely, and then returned the case to the
trial court.

In so doing, the court ruled that the affidavits

accompanying the motion demonstrated that the "bias and
prejudice, if any, that is alleged was known by the affiants
prior to the court's ruling on the question of jurisdiction."
295 at addendum I.

R.

Noting that defendant filed his motion

"woefully late," the court denied the motion.

Id.

The result reached by the reviewing court is correct.

The

plain language of rule 29(c) (1) (B) states that a motion to
disqualify a judge:
. . . shall be filed after commencement of
the action, but not later than 20 days after
the last of the following:
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to
the judge;
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's
attorney;
(iii) the date on which the moving party
learns or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the grounds
upon which the motion is based.
Utah R. Crim. P. 29 (c) (1) (B) (West 2004).
judicial efficiency.

This rule is rooted in

Ruling in a civil context but with a

rationale equally applicable to the criminal context, the Utah
Supreme Court has observed:
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[D]elay imposes unnecessary disruption on
both the judicial system and litigants. A
disqualification proceeding is a collateral
attack on the substantive action, it disrupts
orderly litigation, and it necessarily
results in significant additional cost to the
parties. Accordingly, a party must move with
dispatch once a basis for disqualification is
discovered.
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan A s s o c , 767 P.2d 538, 542
(1988).18

"Timeliness," the court emphasized, "is essential in

filing a motion to disqualify."

Id.

Therefore, the court added,

"[o]nly if good cause for a delay is demonstrated in the motion
seeking disqualification should a delinquent motion even be
considered."

Id. at 543.

The rule that a motion to disqualify

should be filed at the earliest opportunity is widely recognized,
and "courts generally apply this rule with strictness against a
party who, having knowledge of facts constituting a
disqualification, does not seek to disqualify the judge until an
unfavorable ruling has been made."
Judges § 202, at 225-26

Id. (quoting 4 6 Am.Jur.2d

(1969)).

Here, the case was assigned soon after the information was
filed, and defense counsel entered his appearance less than a
month later.

R. 2-3, 4-5.

The motion to disqualify, therefore,

should have been filed after the information, but no later than

18

At the time the Utah Supreme Court decided Madsen, rule
63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing
disqualification of judges, did not contain a time limit. 767
P.2d at 541. Since that time, both the civil and criminal rules
governing disqualification have been amended to include specific
time limits. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B)(West 2004); Utah R.
Crim. P. 29(c)(1)(B)(West 2004).
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20 days after defendant knew or should have known of the grounds
that formed the basis of the motion to disqualify.

See Utah R.

Crim. P. 29(c) (1 (B) .
The grounds for the motion to disqualify are contained in
four affidavits submitted in support of the motion.
92.

See R. 280-

The fourth affiant, defense counsel himself, documents his

experience with Judge Payne in another case in which the court
relied on blood quantum to rule against his client.

See R. 281-

84.
The information contained in defense counsel's affidavit was
plainly based on counsel's previous professional experience.
There is no question but that the information was known to him
prior to the commencement of this action.

Despite defense

counsel's knowledge, however, he did not file the motion until a
year after this action was commenced, immediately after receiving
an unfavorable ruling on the burden of proof issue.

See R. 277.

Moreover, defendant offers no good cause to explain his elevenmonth delay in filing the motion.
Rule 29(c)(3)(C) plainly states: "The reviewing judge may
deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.''
29(c)(3)(C).

Utah R. Crim. P.

Where defendant knew of the grounds on which his

motion was based before the litigation even began and offered no
good cause for delay in filing it, the trial court properly
denied his motion.

Because the motion was untimely, no further

review of defendant's substantive claim is warranted.
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See Birch

v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1989) (declining to
reach legal sufficiency of affidavit alleging judicial bias
because of untimeliness of motion to disqualify).
Defendant's claim also fails because the affidavits on which
he relies are legally insufficient to support his allegation of
bias.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3)(A)("If the reviewing judge

finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in
good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall
assign another judge to the action. . . " ) .

All four of

defendant's affidavits in support of the motion document
instances in which Judge Payne relied on blood quantum to
determine that either the affiant or the affiant's offspring did
not meet the legal definition of Indian for jurisdictional
purposes.

See R. 285-92.

The law is well-settled that judicial

N

'bias may not be based solely on the fact that the judge has

issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation."
In the Interest of M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998).
Accord In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah
1997)(memorandum decision of Zimmerman, C.J., sitting
alone)(stating

NM

no deduction of bias and prejudice may be made

from adverse rulings by a judge.'" (quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges §
219 (1994))); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan A s s o c , 767
P.2d at 546 (stating "^traditional judicial view is that if a
judge can be disqualified for bias following a . . . ruling
during the court proceedings, there is no limit to
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disqualification motions and there would be a return to "judge
shopping"'" (quotation omitted)).
Because defendant's motion and the supporting affidavits
were both untimely and legally insufficient, the reviewing judge
properly refused to reassign the case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for one count of aiding or assisting in wanton
destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^S^day of April, 2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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prepaid, to Michael L. Humiston, attorney for appellant, 25 West
Center Street, P.O. Box 486, Heber City, Utah 84032, this payday
of April, 2005.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

APPEALS

ooOoo

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG202004

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

ORDER OF
CONSOLIDATION
Case No. 20040371-CA

Rickie L. Reber,
Defendant and Appellant.
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20040464-CA
Case No. 20040644-CA

v.
Steven Paul Thunehorst,
Defendant and Appellant.
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20040465-CA
Case No. 20040645-CA

v.
Tex William Atkins,
Defendant and Appellant,

This matter is before the court on Appellants1 motion to
consolidate appeals pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The State of Utah does not oppose
consolidation. Each of the above-captioned criminal appeals
originating in the Eighth District Court, Vernal Department,
raises identical issues. The parties stipulated in the district
court that the jurisdictional ruling in State v. Reber, Eighth
District Court No. 021800320, would be binding in each case, and
the court resolved jurisdiction as to each case in its Modified

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on January 29,
2004. On the basis of the foregoing, the court agrees that
consolidation of State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA, State v.
Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA, State v.w .
Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 20040644-CA is
appropriate. Our consolidation order includes the duplicate
appeals for Atkins and Thunehorst, which were opened following
the entry of signed judgment and order on July 30, 2 004, and the
filing of a second notice of appeal in each case on August 2,
2004.
The motion to consolidate appeals also seeks consolidation
with State v. C.R., Case No. 20040281-CA, a juvenile appeal
related factually to State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA.
Although the juvenile appeal has issues in common with the above
criminal appeals, resolution of the common issues will not
necessarily be dispositive of the juvenile appeal due to the
existence of additional issues raised only by the juvenile
appeal. We decline to include this appeal in the formal
consolidation, but will consider the relationship of the appeals
in calendaring and disposition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals
is granted, in part, and State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA,
State v. Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA,
and State v Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No.
20040644-CA are consolidated for all purposes. All future
filings shall be in Case No. 20040371-CA.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals
is denied, only insofar as it seeks consolidation of State v.
C.R., Case No. 20040281-CA with the above-captioned appeals.
Dated this

day of August, 2 004.

FOR THE COURT:

Gum vn

I^^Q

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
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Addendum B

EDWIN T. PETERSON(#3849)
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84075
Telephone: (435) 781-5428

FILED
,„ DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

JAN 2 9 2004
JOANhEMcKEE, CLERK
BY

-

\U

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Case No. 021800320
RICKIE L. REBER,
Judge A. Lynn Payne
Defendant.
The Court, having previously entered written findings on this matter, adopts those
findings herein and makes further findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon the
stipulations of the parties as follows:

Defendant Rickie L. Reber is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton
destruction of protected wildlife", a third degree felony, for allegedly assisting his
son in taking a trophy buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area
known as the "Book Cliffs" in southern Uintah County. Mr. Reber initially
moved to dismiss the criminal charges claiming to be a member of the
"Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area the alleged act occurred was in
"Indian Country'. Mr. Reber, in the course of the litigation, abandoned his
claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is
a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either Shoshone or Ute decent.
Defendant Steven Paul Thunehorst is charged with "aiding or assisting in the
wanton destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area

known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern
Uintah County. Mr. Thunehorst initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Thunehorst, in the course
of the litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos
Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of
either Shoshone or Ute decent.
3.

Defendant Tex William Atkins is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton
destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern
Uintah County. Mr. Atkins initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Atkins, in the course of the
litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe",
affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either
Shoshone or Ute decent.

4

With respect to Mr. Reber, it was stipulated by the parties that he claimed to be
l/16th Indian by blood, from his mother. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr.
Atkins it was stipulated by the parties that they claim to be 1/16th Indian by
blood, from their grandmother. Mr. Reber's mother, and the grandmother of Mr.
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed on the termination proclamation. Their
status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute Partition act of 1954, 25
U.S.C. sec 677 et seq. (Hereinafter the "UPA). Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins
may have a grandparent who had Indian blood but was not a member of a tribe
which was recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs as an Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of
Indian affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribe.
Mr. Thunehorst and Mr.
Atkins have not produced evidence of the heritage of this person.

5

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins are not members of any Indian tribe
recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as an
Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by
virtue of their status as Indian tribe.

6

Mr. Reber is 51 years old, or was at the time of this Courts last ruling.

7

Mr. Reber was born in Roosevelt Utah and lived in Lapoint Utah until he was 22.

8

Mr. Reber has not lived on or near the Ute Indian Reservation since he was 22.

9

Mr. Reber does not now claim to be a member of the Timpanogos tribe.

10

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins do not now maintain that the permit
that they produced when they were contacted by law enforcement was valid, but
do maintain that they believed that the permit was valid at that time of the alleged
violations.

11.

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins claim to be members of the "I Jintah
Band", and that is the only group that they claim to be associated with.
They all maintain that they are Indians of Utah Territory. They do not claim to be
members of the Ute Indian Tribe, or of the Uintah band of the Ute Indian tribe
which is one of the three constituent bands which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe,

12.

Mr. Reber was alive in 1961. Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins were born after
1961, however Mr. Thunehorst's and Mr. Atkin's mothers, who were sisters, were
alive at the time of the termination proclamation in 1961.

The Court makes the following conch isic lis of la « v
With respect to Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, even if the court were to not
consider the issue of the UP A, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.9 they do not have significant blood
quantum under the first prong of the two part analysis stated in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846), which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Perank,
858 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) to be considered an Indian. The Court can find no benefit which
is available base upon Indian blood quantum of 1/16th. Therefore for the purpose of qualifying
for Federal programs or recognition they do not qualify based upon their quantum of blood.
When describing a person as having 1/16 Indian Blood one must realize that necessarily means
that same person is 15/16 non Indian. That means that he has 6 1/4% Indian blood and
93 3/4 non Indian blood. This percentage of blood is simply not high enough to meet the first
prong of the Rogers Test. The Court has found no Federal or State case which determined a
percentage of Indian blood as low as 6.25 % to be significant under the Rogers Test. There is
judicial precedence, Vialpando vs Wyoming. 640 P.2d 77, that 12 V2 % was not substantial
under the Rogers Test. Other case have held that 12 lA % is substantial. This Court is unaware
of any case which has gone below 12/4 %. The case that held 12'>4 % was substantial is Sully
vs. United States 195 Fed. 2d. 113 which was issued by the 8th Circuit and is an old case.
Even if Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkin's blood quantum was of a significant
amount, the Court finds that the UP A terminated their status as an Indian for the purpose of
criminal jurisdiction. Congress has the plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes in all matters.
An individuals status as Indian for jurisdictional purposes is subject to the power of Congress to
allocate jurisdiction between the State, Tribes, and the Federal Government. Congress clearly has
the unilateral power to grant the State jurisdictions over persons who are Indian. . The statute in
this case (Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.) says that upon termination, all statutes of
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be
applicable to such member over which supervision was terminated and the laws of the several
States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other citizens within their
jurisdiction. That provision clearly grants to the State jurisdiction over all persons who are listed
in the termination proclamation which would include Mr. Reber's mother and Mr. Thunhorst and

Mr. Atkins' grandmother. Therefore, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, Mr. Reber's
Mother and Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother are no longer considered to be Indian.
The natural consequence of termination of these ancestors as Indian is that each of the
Defendant's would not be considered to have received any Indian blood from, in Mr. Reber's
case, his mother and in Mr Atkins and Mr. Thunhorst case, their grandmother.
The Court does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors status as
Indian only to continue that relationship with their decedents.
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Rogers Mr. Reber, does not have any
Indian blood coming through his mother and since this is the only Indian blood which he claims,
he does not have any Indian blood for the purposes of the Rogers analysis. As for Mr. Thunhorst
and Mr. Atkins they also have no Indian blood coming from their maternal grandmother. The
conclusion of this Court is based upon the conclusions of the Federal Court in the Felter case,
U.S. v Orrana B. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.C. 1982), qff'd 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir 1985) and
the Utah Appellate Court in the Gardner case State v. Gardner. 827 P. 2d 980 (Utah App.
1992)..
Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins argue that in spite of the termination of their
ancestors Indian status, they have not been affected by the UPA; because in Mr. Rebers case he,
and in Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' case their mother was alive at the time of the UPA. The
absence of the Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' mother's name, or in Mr. Rebers case his name
on the termination proclamation is not relevant to this inquiry. It only reflects that at the time of
the termination act, Mr. Reber and the mothers of Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were not
enrolled members of the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could receive
tribal benefits. Because these individuals were not tribal members they could not have been
listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate ancestors were members
of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated.
It is clear to the Court that by 1950 all relevant Indian hunting and fishing rights were
vested in the Ute Indian tribe. No individual had a right to those hunting and fishing rights
except through the tribe, and through membership in the tribe. Again it is evident to the Court
that Congress did not intend to terminate Mr. Reber's mothers status as and Indian and Mr.
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother's status as an Indian, only to recognize their children and
grandchildren to have Indian hunting rights based upon Indian heritage which was
Congressionally terminated. The argument that they were not among the 490 individuals listed in
the UPA is therefore without merit. One is either a member or not. Whether or not they were
eligible to be an individual who was entitled to membership is not the issue. Before this Court
can take note of any privilege which is based upon tribal membership, that person must apply for
and be granted membership by the tribe. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Reber, Mr.
Thunhorst or Mr. Atkins have ever applied for or been granted membership by the Ute Indian
Tribe. And there is no indication that Mr. Thunhorst, Mr. Reber or Mr. Atkins has been granted
any other tribal membership.
It would be inappropriate for the Court to extend any privilege which is available only
through membership when the tribe has never granted those privileges through membership.
Even if a Defendant may have once been eligible for membership that would not be relevant.
You either are a tribal member or you're not. If you are eligible you need to apply and be granted
those privileges. The Court was further convinced after reading Judge Jenkins opinion in Felter
which was the basis for the Murdoch decision, U.Sv. Murdoch. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir 1997),

that there is a connection. The Court finds that all of those rights are vested in the Tribe. A
members interest in that tribal property is personal and cannot be transferred or inherited. It is
true that those 490 persons who were terminated under the UPA continue to have hunting and
fishing rights it is not true that their heirs would continue to claim any interest in tribal property
in their own right if they were not given the privileges of tribal membership. The rights of the
terminated Utes to hunt and fish was not their personal property right and would be extinguished
with their death and is not transferable or inheritable. The children of persons listed on the
Termination Proclamation are not entitled through their parents to enjoy hunting and fishing
privileges. There was a foot note I think from the Murdoch case, citing Judge Jenkins opinion in
the Felter case, and I'm going to paraphrase that. In essence he said, those who are terminated
Utes are readily identified and that their rights can be ascertained and that attrition would
eventually extinguish the rights that they have because those rights are not inheritable or
transferable and ultimately those rights would end
The Court finds that Mr Reber does not have, independent of the Termination Act,
sufficient blood quantum to qualify for an Indian under the Rogers Test. I believe for purposes
considering the Termination Act considering the Rogers Test he has no Indian blood. Mr. Reber
does not and can not have any hunting or fishing rights that come through his mother, because
they have been terminated and they are not transferrable even though he was alive at the time of
the Termination Act. Mr. Reber rights must be connected to the tribe who were the ones who
had the hunting and fishing rights. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins the Court
will not consider, for purpose of analysis, the Indian blood coming through their Maternal
Grandmother. The same analysis will apply with respect to whether or not they receive any
hunting or fishing rights from their Maternal Grandmother. Because the Court has found that no
Defendant has sufficient blood quantum to satisfy the first prong of the Rodgers decision the
Court need not inquire as to the second.
All Motions with respect to claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction which are
based upon claims that the defendants are Indians are denied. The Court has jurisdiction to hear
the criminal cases which have been filed.

Dated this
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A. Lynn Payne
Eighth District Coin

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I do hereby certify that I delivered by US Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Michael L.
Humiston Attorney for Defendant, 23 West Center Street P.O. Box 486 Heber City, Utah 84032,
on this " ^ 7 , day of January, 2004.
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Edwin T. Peterson, 3849
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152 East 100 North
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Telephone:(435) 781-5435
Fax: (435)781-5428

DISTRICT COURT
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
\\\

sH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND UKl>r
PROBATION

vs.
RICKIE L. REBER
DOB: 06/27/1954

Case No. 023800320
Judge A. Lynn Payne

Defendant.

OFFENSE:

AIDING OR ASSISTING IN THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED

\V!L[)LII'i: a lliiid Jcgiiv lt-l.ui,,
THIS MATTER came on regularly before the above-named Court for sentencing this
i» \ i'E, loilowing Defendant's adjudication of guilt in a jury trial to the above set forth offense,
the Honorable A. Lynn i''^':^ presiding. The Defendant wos pnx..nal!v nrwnt :n-,.H ,, ,..
represented by his attorney of record, Michael Humiston. The State was represented by Edwin '.!'.
TVi.ITS M

The Court, having received statements by the State, Defense Counsel, the Defendant, and
having reviewed letters submitted by Defendant, and no legal reason having been shown why
judgment and sentencing should not be pronounced, entered a Judgment as follows:
That the above-named Defendant, RICKDE L. REBER, is hereby adjudged to be guilty of
the crime of AIDING OR ASSISTING IN THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED
WILDLIFE, in violation of 23-20-4 and 23-20-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a
third degree felony. Defendant is hereby sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term of no more than five (5) years. Execution of the prison sentence is suspended
and the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of three (3) years on the following terms
and conditions:
1.

That the Defendant abide by the terms of a probation stated herein.

2.

That the Defendant make himself available to report to this or any other Court

whenever requested to do so.
3.

That the Defendant keep the Court and the Uintah County Attorney's Office

informed of his current residential address and telephone number.
4.

That the Defendant violate no laws of the United States, State of Utah, or any

municipality during the term of this probation.
5.

Defendant is to pay fine of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250.00) or

complete two hundred fifty (250) hours of community service, to be approved prior to it's
accomplishment by the Uintah County Attorneys office, with proof of completion to the Court by

2

October 18, 2004. The Court shall hold the fine until all appellate eon<n\-W .<•.•:•
completed.
6

iVferuLtnii is (<•' ( u \ I" n (In

ml ikillai^ « $') ,(.)()( M nil in K s t i n i l i i m in ilic 11 kill

Department of Wildlife Resources "stop poaching fund". The court finds that a downward
depariun' in die recommended statutory restitution is in order due to the unusual factual basis of
the'case and Defendant's lack of any prior criminal record. Restit ilmi .li;ill lw» punl In

OMMIH'T

18, 2004. The Court shall hold the restitution until all appellate considerations, if any, are
i:i 11 n p i e I I

Defendant is not to have any firearms in his possession.
8.

Defendant is n : t tc hunt except with state issued license.

The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter.
.. aEDthis

ML

A. Lynn P^yne
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FO;

Michael Humiston

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY

3

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION to Michael Humiston, Attorney for
Defendant, 23 West Center Street, Heber City, UT 84032; Department of Corrections, 152 East
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; and the Uintah County Jail, Vernal, Utah.
DATED this Jj^i

day of
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Addendum D

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILED

RULING

DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

Plaintiff,

SEP 0 9 2303
JOANi

vs.

MjbKEE, CLERK

BY.

Case AU..

RICKIE L. REBER,

MJCb^U

Defendant.

This matter came Ik ti n i lU i 'vun I i m jnc
L 3, 2UUJ lor hearing. At the hearing the
parties stipulated that:
1 The Defendant's mother carried 1/8 "Indian Blood", and was named on the
Termination Proclamation in 1961.1
2. The Defendant's father dors no! bavr amy "IIIHIL^ .•• • . .
3. The Defendant is 15,16 non-Indian by blood and 1.16 Indian by blood.
4. The Defendant /- ••>• .t .-.i-mocr oi any Indian'Iribe recognized as a Tribe by
the United States Government.
r

. The Defendant is 51 years old. He was born in Roosevelt and lived in
Lapoint, Utah until he was 22. He has not lived in Indian Country since he was 22.
6. Thel>frn<h;u ,:•

mpanogos

Tribe".
7. rIlie Defendant does not maintain that the permit which he produced when he

1

In 1954 Congress passed the Lite Termination Act, August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, 68 State
868, which is now found at 25 U.S.C. 677. "The Termination Proclamation, contemplated by
Section 23 of the "Act", 25 U.S.C. Section 677v., was issued and published by the Secretary
effective at midnight August 27, 1961. 26 Fed. Reg. 8.042." Affiliated Utes v. United States 406
U.S. 128 at p 139; see also United States v. Felter. 546 F. Supp. 1002 (Utah D.C. 1982), at page
p. 1006.
1

DEPUTY

was first contacted by law enforcement is valid. He does maintain that, at that time, he
believed that the permit was valid.
This Court is bound by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perank, 858
P.2d 927 and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399. Each of these cases held that the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished and that there is no outer
boundary to the reservation. The United States Supreme Court noted: "The operative
language of the 1902 Act provided for allocations of reservation land to Indians, and that all
the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain". (At
412)..."It follows that when lands so reserved were 'restored' to the public domain - - i.e.,
once again opened to sale or settlement- - their previous public use was extinguished" (at 412).
The Court then noted that when lands were returned to public domain, this stripped the land of
reservation status (at p412). Finally the Court indicated that "our cases considering operative
language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate
reservation status." (at p. 413). Finally the Court held: "In light of our precedents, we hold
that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with die continuation of
reservation status."
Federal law defines Indian Country to include land within: Indian Reservations,
dependent Indian Communities, and Indian Allotments. 18 U.S.C. 1151 (a), (b),(c). Federal
case law also reserves jurisdiction of crimes which occur wiihin "Indian Country" involving an
Indian as a victim to the tribes or the Federal Government. 18 U.S.C. 1152; Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676. However, State Courts have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes which occur
within Indian Country where the defendant and victim are not Indian. Williams v. U.S., 327
U.S. 711; State v. RoedL 155 P.2d 741 (Utah 1945). Federal Statutes do not define "Indian"
for criminal jurisdictional purposes. In United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 57273 (1846), the United States Supreme Court suggested two factors to be evaluated in
determining who is an Indian: (1) Whether the individual has a significant degree of Indian
blood; and (2) Whether the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe, or society
of Indians, or by the Federal Government. The Rogers test for determining Indian status has
been adopted by the Utah Appellate and Supreme Courts. State of Utah v. Hagen, 802 P2d
745, 748 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990); State of Utah v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927; 932 (Ut. S. CT.,
1992). Until the Utah Supreme Court announces a new standard, this Court is bound by the
Hagen

2

and Perank cases. Therefore, this Court will follow the Rogers test in determining whether
the Defendant is an Indian. Any argument that Utah should follow the test announced in
Lapier vs. McCormick. 986 F.2d 303 should be addressed to the Supreme Court.2
Federal statutes do not address the issue of who has the burden to prove that a
defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in "Indian Country". The Utah
Appellate Court in Hagen stated: "The State properly concedes that the prosecution was
required to prove jurisdiction, i e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a
preponderance of evidence." The Hagen Court cited State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 469470, as authority for the proposition that the State had the burden of showing that a defendant
was not an Indian. However, the issue in Sorenson concerned territorial rather than personal
jurisdiction. While territorial jurisdiction must be proved by the State by a preponderance of
evidence in every criminal case (State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032) personal jurisdiction is not an
element of an offense and need not be proved as such. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has
not been consistent in requiring the State prove an individual is not an Indian. In an
unpublished opinion (State v. Lucero, Case No. 860213 - Ca) a different panel of the
Appellate Court held: "...Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial Court that he was an
'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. Section 1152-53." More importantly, our
Supreme Court has indicated: "On these facts, we conclude that Perank carried his burden of
factually establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute Indian." Perank at 933.
Given the fact that the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and that it is the
opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow that decision. Therefore,
altliough the State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries
of the State of Utah and Uintah County, the defendant has the burden to show, by a

2

Some have argued that Indian status, for the purposes of determining Federal jurisdiction
under Section 1152 and 1153 should be based entirely upon membership in a Federally
recognized Indian Tribe. This test would allow Indians to make their own determination ot
"Indian" status Reliance upon tribal membership would also provide an understandable and
workable standard. It would avoid consideration of such subjective and transitory issues as selfconcept as being Indian and recognition as being Indian within Indian Society. It further avoids
the quagmire encountered in making a determination of "Indian" status based upon Federal
recognition Federal Statutes and Regulations which define "Indian" are inconsistent and
confusing. Individuals are defined as "Indian" for some purposes and programs, but are not
defined as "Indian" for other purposes and programs Where an individual comes within some,
but not all, federal definitions, where does the Court draw the line in determining "Indian" status
Is it sufficient if an individual meets at least one federal definition, or must he be recognized
within "most" definitions; or perhaps he must meet all federal definitions of "Indian". A
definition of "Indian" for the purpose of applying section 1152 which relies upon membership m
a Federally recognized Indian tribe provide a much more workable standard than the test set forth
in Hagen Nevertheless, most courts who have considered this issue have adopted the Hagen
test.
3

preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under the Rogers test.
Placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with what two Courts have
characterized as the majority position of courts which have addressed the issue. Arizona v.
Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1995 Ariz. App. Ct.); Vermont v. St. Francis. 563 A.2d 249.
This is consistent with case law in: Arizona (VerdugoV. Vermont (St. FrancisV. New Mexico
(State of New Mexico v. Cutnose. 532 P.2d 896, (N.M. App. 1974)); Nevada (State of
Nevada v. Jack. 96 P.497 (1908)); Pendleton v. Sate of Nevada 734 P.2d 693 (1987);
Oklahoma (State of Oklahoma v. Klindt. 782 P.2d 401, (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Washington
(State of Washington v. Daniels, 16 P. 3d 650) and with sound public policy, "...the general
rule is that the State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial
border. ...As an exception to that general rule, however, the Indian Country Crimes Act
preempts State Court jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution when an offense involving an
Indian occurs on Indian land...The federal statute is silent, however, on the issue of who bears
the burden of proof to establish these jurisdictional facts." Verdugo at 1167. The Arizona
Appellate Court then noted that while the State bears the burden to show the offense occurred
within State boundaries, the elements of a criminal offense do not require the State to prove
that the crime did not involve an Indian. The Court notes that to require the State to prove
that the defendant and the victim were not Indian would place "...the state...in a position of
having to prove the nonoccurence of events which might deprive it of jurisdiction." (Verdugo
at 1168). The court went on to note: "If we were to place this burden on the state, the state
would be compelled to allege...every conceivable exception to State Court jurisdiction."
(Verdugo at 1168). Not only would the state be required to allege every exception to
jurisdiction, the state would have the affirmative burden to prove that the exception did not
apply.
Wigmore suggest that in determining \yho should bear the burden of proof it is
appropriate to consider that it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a fact and it is
appropriate to place the burden on die party who presumably has particular means of
knowledge.) Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2486 (1981). It is therefore
relevant that there are over three hundred Indian Tribes which have been recognized by the
Federal Government. Membership in any one of these tribes would be sufficient to meet the
second test as set forth in Rogers (i.e. that the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a
tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal Government). In addition to Federally
recognized tribes there are many more Indian groups or societies of Indians which may form
the basis to establish the second test in Rogers. It would therefore be virtually impossible for
the state to prove that a particular individual was not a member of any of the possible tribes
and Indian societies throughout the United States. Additionally, in many cases it would be
impossible to prove that a particular person did not have a significant degree of Indian blood
(which is the first test under Rogers). While it may be possible to determine the identity of a
defendant's parents it may be impossible to prove that the parents do not have Indian blood.
In the case of adopted persons, it would often be impossible to determine that the biological
parents were not Indian. This becomes even more difficult as you consider whether
4

grandparents and great grandparents (who may be deceased) have Indian blood. All of this is
complicated by the liberal interpretation courts have given to the term significant degree of
Indian blood. Generally twenty-five percent is considered substantial. It is obvious that, the
information which is relevant to a defendant's blood lines as well as his or her associations
with Indian Tribes and societies, is uniquely within the knowledge of the Defendant and is
usually readily available to the Defendant, while such information is often unavailable to the
State.
One must also remember that under 1151 the state is deprived of jurisdiction when a
victim is an Indian. If the state bears the burden of proof, the state must show that each victim
in every case is not an Indian. In most cases this could be easily accomplished by asking the
victim a few simple questions during trial. However, not all victims are available to be
examined at trial. Victims move and sometimes can not be located. Victims may die prior to
trial. By definition, a victim in a homicide would never be available to testify concerning their
blood lines or association with Indian Tribes and societies. Because Indian status may depend
on association with Indian tribes, culture, and society, it would often be difficult to prove that
a victim who is not present at trial was not an Indian. Occasionally, it is not possible for the
State to even identify the victim by name. (One of the cases cited above (Jack) involved a
victim of a homicide who was "commonly known by the name 'Lotta', whose real name was
to the grand jury unknown." (P 497). If the State were required to prove that it has
jurisdiction by disproving Indian status of each victim, there would be certain cases where the
victim's status as an non-Indian could never be proved. By placing the burden on the State,
this Court would be depriving the State of jurisdiction merely because the State has no access
to the kind of information necessary to prove Indian status under Rogers.
Considering all of the circumstances and public policy the burden is properly placed
upon the defendant to show an exception to state jurisdiction by establishing a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant or victim has a significant degree of Indian blood and has
been recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal
Government.
DATED this

_/_

-'

>f Jmre, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

PAYNE,DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 1 -? day of ^iw^iryy^H^
2003, true and correct
copies of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T.
Peterson, Deputy Uintali County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr.
Michael L. Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, at 23 W. Center Street, P.O. Box 486, Heber
City, UT 84032.
\/Rw) I \J[JAL
Deputy Clerk
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§ 1 1 5 1 . Indian country defined
Release date: 2004-08-06
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,
the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means
( a ) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation,
( b ) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state, and
( c ) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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Addendum F

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

v.
Manuel Lucero,

Case No. 860213-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
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Before Judges Billings, Garff and Greenwood.
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PER CURIAM:

r irrr'vhv»/ *K-'ol
Cterk of the- Court
Utah Court oi Appeals

Defendant Manual Lucero appeals his conviction of making
false material statements, a second degree felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-502 (1978). He alleges that because he is an Indian
and associates with the Ute Indian Tribe, and because the crime
was committed in "Indian country," the state court is deprived of
jurisdiction over him.
Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial court that he
was an "Indian" within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152
-53. According to the record, this he failed to do. Such facts
which may be relevant, but evidence of which is absent here,
include: preponderance of Indian blood, recognition by the
federal government or by an organized tribe; and recognized
racial status. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1982);
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982); cf. U.S. v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert, den. 444 U.S.
859 (1979); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 2-3 (1942).
Additionally, in his brief on appeal, appellant does not
support his factual claims with any citation to the record on
appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct.App. 24(a). References to the
record are entirely absent from appellant's statement of facts as
well as the argument section of his brief. In the absence of
proper citations to the record supporting appellant's contentions
on appeal, we presume regularity of the proceedings below and
affirm the trial court. State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah
1982); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983); State v.
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d
287 (Utah 1986); cf. Trees v. Lewis, 56 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 8 (1986).

Appellant has the responsibility to marshal for this Court
those pertinent references to the record that support his
contentions on appeal. We will not undertake a complete review
of the multiple volume record to search out error when appellant
fails to do so.
We view the evidence in the record as supporting the trial
court1s determination that defendant is not an Indian for
purposes of §§ 1152-53.
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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Addendum G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TIMPANOGOS TRIBE, Snake Band of
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory,
Plaintiff,

VS.

,

ORDER

j

KEVIN CONWAY, Assistant Director, Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Division of
Wildlife Resources,

CaseNo.2:00~CV-734TC

Defendant,

and

UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH
AND OURAY RESERVATION,
Defendant-Intervenor.

This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by
Defendant Kevin Conway, Assistant Director of the State of Utah's Division of Wildlife
Resources, and Defendant-Intervenor Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
(collectively "Defendants").
This case deals with the priority of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the Ute
Indian Tribe's Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Reservation") in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, the

self-proclaimed Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory,
maintains in its Complaint that it has the right to issue hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to
its members for use on the Reservation without interference from the Ute Indian Tribe or the
State of Utah. It asserts this right based on its claim that its members are descendants of the
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah, which existed on the Reservation land before
either the Ute Tribe or the Reservation were established. Plaintiff further alleges that the
Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah was Shoshone, not Ute, and that it maintained independence
as a Shoshone tribe before and after the Ute Tribe and the Reservation were established.
Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that its members have superior aboriginal rights in the land's
natural resources.
Defendants do not recognize the Plaintiffs status as a tribe. Rather, they contend that the
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians was Ute, not Shoshone, and that it merged into the
Uintah Ute band of Indians (precursor to the Ute Tribe) in 1865. As a result of the merger,
Defendants claim that the aboriginal Timpanogos band ceased to maintain an identity
independent of the Ute Tribe and that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
hunting, fishing, and gathering on the Reservation. Defendants also claim that the State of Utah
has the right to prosecute individuals who are caught hunting, fishing, or gathering on the
Reservation without a permit issued by the Ute Tribe*
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with
prejudice and judgment in Defendants' favor on their Joint Counterclaim (which is essentially a
mirror image of Plaintiff s claims). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory
("Timpanogos Tribe") is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Nevertheless, Timpanogos
Tribe claims aboriginal rights on land in Utah for its members, specifically the right to issue
hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to its members in the area known as the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation or Uintah Valley Reservation ('^Reservation") without interference from the State of
Utah or the Ute Indian Tribe ("Ute Tribe")- As the basis for its claims, the Timpanogos Tribe
alleges that its members are Shoshone, not Ute, and that it has the right to issue permits because,
it alleges, its members are the "Indians ... for whom the [Reservation] was set apart." (Am.
Verified Compl. <[fl[ 12-13.) It further alleges that its members, allegedly ancestors of the
aboriginal Shoshone in Utah, have therightto hunt, fish, and gather on the Reservationfreefrom
prosecution by the State for hunting,fishing,or gathering without a permit issued by the State or
the Ute Tribe.
The Ute Tribe asserts that it, not Timpanogos Tribe, has the exclusive right to issue
permits for hunting, fishing and gathering on the Reservation and that permits issued by the
Timpanogos Tribe are not valid. The State of Utah asserts that the Timpanogos Tribe does not
have the authority to issue such permits. Further, it does not recognize the Timpanogos Tribeissued permits as valid and intends to prosecute (or already has prosecuted) anyone (including
members of the Timpanogos Tribe) for hunting,fishing,or gathering within the Reservation
without a valid permit.
The Defendants claim that the Timpanogos Tribe is trying to re-write history. The State
3

and the Ute Tribe assert that the Timpanogos Tribe1 was actually one of five bands of Utes that
merged to form the Uintah Utes, who later, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands
of Utes, joined together to form what is known today as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation. The Ute Tribe claims exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, which
jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribal Business Committee, the Ute Tribe's elected governing
body, through the Ute Tribe Constitution.
In support of their argument, the Defendants point to a series of "Findings of Fact" in two
1957 Indian Claims Commission ('ICC") decisions in the matter of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah
v. United States, that, Defendants allege, conclusively establish that the Timpanogos merged
with the Uintah Utes and thereafter ceased to exist independently of the Ute Tribe. See Uintah
Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, Docket No. 44 (ICC Feb. 21, 1957), attached as Ex. 2 to
Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 44"); Uintah Ute
Indians of Utah v. United States. Docket No. 45 (ICC Feb. 21, 1957), attached as Ex. 3 to Defs.'
Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 45").
Obviously, the factual findings of ICC are at odds with the claims the Timpanogos Tribe
makes in this case. Pointing to the ICC decisions, the Defendants assert that the Timpanogos
Tribe's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. But
Timpanogos Tribe contends, among other things, that the Ute Tribe may not rely on the ICC
decisions as precedent because of a 1960 stipulation between the Ute Tribe and the United States
stating that the "final judgment [in the two 1957 ICC decisions]... shall not be construed as an

defendants do not concede that the Timpanogos are a tribe. (See Defs.' Mot. at 2 n.l.)
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admission of either party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case." See PL's
Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-16 (quoting Apr. 22,1960 Stipulation for Entry of
Final Judgment in the case of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, attached as Ex. A to
PL's Mem.).
In addition to their issue preclusion defense, the Defendants submitted two expert reports
purporting to set forth the history of the Ute Tribe and the relationship of the Timpanogos to the
Utes. (See Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.'
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and
Archaeologist), attached as Ex. 5 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the
Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe
known as the Timpanogos Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the
Timpanogos, other than as members of the Ute Tribe, have no independent rights on the
Reservation. (See id. at 2.) Both of Defendants' experts opine that historical, anthropological,
and archaeological documentation shows that Plaintiffs' allegations are simply wrong, (See
O'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert
Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological, archaeological or historical evidence that supports
such claims.").) They also conclude that the ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fully
supported by the historical record and are accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3*r Janetski Expert
Report at 2.)
Timpanogos Tribe did not submit its own expert reports in rebuttal, but it did submit
affidavit testimony and other documentation in an effort to rebut the conclusions of the
Defendants* experts. Defendants maintain that because Timpanogos Tribe did not submit an
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expert witness report in rebuttal, as a matter of law the Plaintiff cannot prevail over the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. According to the Defendants, the issues raised are
beyond the experience of the ordinary layperson and therefore require expert testimony. That is,
the Defendants contend that because two expert witnesses came to a conclusion favoring the
position of the Defendants, and because Timpanogos Tribe did not present contrary evidence in
the form of an expert report, Defendants are per se entitled to summary judgment.
The court analyzes each set of arguments in turn below.
ANALYSIS
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 144 R3d 664,670
(10th Cir. 1998). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs
position will be insufficient [to overcome a motion for summary judgment]; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. at
252. See also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.» 181 F3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Amere
scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's theory does not create a genuine issue of
material fact.").

6

Defendants' Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion Defense
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "'[w]hen an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit"' United States v, Botefuhr. 309 F.3d
1263, 1282 (10th Or. 2002) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)). The
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the four elements of issue preclusion. Adams v.
Kinder-Morgan. Inc.. 340 F.3d 1083,1093 (10th Cir. 2003). Those elements are: "'(1) the issue
previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior
action has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action." Botefuhr. 309 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190,1197 (10th
Cir. 2000)).
Thelessential issue in this case is whether the members of the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe
are actually ancestors of the Timpanogos, one of five historic Ute bands, and whether that band
merged into the Uintah Ute Band of Indians, which then ultimately became the Ute Tribe for
whom the Reservation was set aside. The 1957 ICC decisions addressed similar, if not identical,
factual issues regarding aboriginal title to the Reservation and the make-up of the Uintah Ute
Band through a determination of which smaller Indian bands merged into the larger Uintah Band.
For example, the ICC found that the Shoshone and Utes were "separate and distinct." (Docket
No. 44 at Finding of Fact No. 5.) The ICC also found that the Timpanogos merged into the
Uintah Utes in 1865. (Id at Finding of Fact No. 4; Docket No. 45 at Finding of Fact No. 3.) The
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ICC found that the Uintah Utes band, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands of
Utes, occupied the Reservation and are now known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation. (Docket No. 44 at p. 32.) All of these issues are before this court.
The parties in the ICC litigation were the United States and the Ute Tribe. The State was
not involved in the litigation, but it appears to agree with and rely upon the findings of fact issued
by the ICC in the 1957 decisions. The question becomes whether Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe
was a party to the 1957 litigation or was a party in privity with the Ute Tribe in 1957.
Defendants contend that Timpanogos Tribe was a party to the litigation (through the Ute Tribe)
because the Timpanogos merged into the Ute Tribe in 1865. But this begs the question facing
the court now and presents a circular argument (i.e.. the Defendants' privity argument assumes
the very fact it must prove - that the Plaintiff actually merged with and became part of the Ute
Tribe in 1865, thereby ceasing to maintain an independent identity after that point).
Given the unique circumstances of this case, the court finds that the Defendants have
failed to establish the third element of issue preclusion. Accordingly, the Timpanogos Tribe is
not collaterally estopped by the ICC decisions from raising the issues now before the court.2

2

The court does not agree with the Timpanogos Tribe's argument that the 1960
Stipulation between the U.S. and the Ute Tribe (in which the parties finally settled the litigation
and agreed that thefinaljudgment of the ICC "shall not be construed as an admission of either
party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case" (Ex. A. to PL's Opp'n Mem.))
prevents the Ute Tribe from relying on the ICC decisions as precedent. See, e.g.. U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship. 513 U.S. 18,26-27 (1994) ('"Judicial precedents are
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court finds that the public interest would be
served by a vacatur.'") (internal citation omitted). In any event, Timpanogos Tribe's argument
does not affect the State's right to cite to the ICC decisions, because the State was not a party to
the Stipulation. Further, as noted above, the court is not allowing the Defendants to rely on the
ICCfindingsof fact as evidence.
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Nor will the court take judicial notice of the ICC Findings of Fact, as the Defendants
suggest it should,3 because that would essentially undermine the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and be contrary to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 201 provides that "[a] judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). See
also Tavlor v. Charter Med Corp,. 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998) ("court cannot take
judicial notice of the factual findings of another court.. • because (1) suchfindingsdo not
constitute facts 'not subject to reasonable dispute' within the meaning of Rule 201; and (2) 'were
[it] permissible for a court to take judicial notice of a fact merely because it had been found to be
true in some other action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous.'") (internal
citations omitted); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.. 128 F.3d 1074,1082
n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) ("courts generally cannot take notice offindingsof fact from other
proceedings for the truth asserted therein because thesefindingsare disputable and usually are
disputed."); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing to Fed.
R. Evid. 201(b), and noting that taking judicial notice of anything but a "universal truth"
established by common knowledge, or "certain facts, which from their nature are not properly the
subject of testimony," would be improper). Indeed, Defendants essentially admit the facts at
issue in this case are not common knowledge, because they argue that the subject necessarily

3

See Defs/ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 12 (quoting language in Havasupai
Tribe v United States. 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), affU 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991),
which said that the "ICC proceedings . . . are an appropriate subject for judicial notice").
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requires expert testimony. Besides, it is clear that the factual issues before the ICC were subject
to reasonable dispute and were determined after consideration of much documentary evidence.
This creates a potential problem for the Defendants, because Defendants' Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts relies in part on the ICC Findings of Fact as evidentiary support for
their position, (See, e.g., Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ, J. at 5-12.) But Defendants also
rely on their expert reports, which do support Defendants' statement of facts.
Expert Evidence
Plaintiffs Failure to Present Expert Rebuttal Evidence
To the extent that Defendants are contending that because the Plaintiff has failed to
submit expert rebuttal evidence, as a matter of law Defendants are entitled to summary judgment,
the court disagrees. The cases cited by Defendants - Randolph v. Collectramatic. Inc., 590 F.2d
844, 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1979), and Keller v. Albright 1 R Supp. 2d 1279,1281-82 (D. Utah
1997), affd. 141 F3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) - do not support such an argument.
Rather, the issue is whether the Plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that creates a
genuine issue of material fact that must be tried by a jury.
Defendants' Expert Evidence and Plaintiffs Rebuttal Evidence
Defendants' Evidence
Defendants* experts provide strong evidence to support Defendants' position.4 (See
Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and Archaeologist),

4

The Plaintiff has not challenged the qualifications or methodology of the Defendants'
expert witnesses.
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attached as Ex. 5 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the Timpanogos merged
with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos
Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the Timpanogos, other than as
members of the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation. See id, at 2. Both of Defendants'
experts opine that the historical, anthropological, and archaeological documentation shows that
Plaintiffs* allegations are simply wrong. (See O'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical
evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological,
archaeological or historical evidence that supports such claims.").) They also conclude that the
ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fully supported by the historical record and are
accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3; Janetski Expert Report at 2.)
Plaintiffs Evidence
In opposition, Plaintiff submitted the following evidence: Affidavit of Mary Meyer (Ex. E
to PL's Mem. In Opp'n (hereinafter "Opp'n Mem.")), Affidavit of Dave Montes (Ex. J to Opp'n
Mem.), an excerpt from the 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal (Ex. G to Opp'n Mem.)> the
October 3,1861 Executive Order setting aside the Uintah Valley Reservation (Ex. H to Opp'n
Mem.), an 1863 map purporting to show the boundaries of Shoshone territories (attached to the
decision in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States. 95 Ct CI. 642 (1942),
affd, 324 U.S. 335 (1945), and one or more 1863 United States treaties with the Shoshone) (Ex.
L to Opp'n Mem.), a copy of the unratified June 8, 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty (Ex, I to Opp'n
Mem.), the Utah State Tax Commission Apr. 27, 2000 Decision in the matter ofMaryMeverv.
Customer Serv. Div, of the Utah State Tax Comm'n (Ex. C to Opp'n Mem.), the State's PreHearing Memorandum in the same Utah State Tax Commission matter (Ex. D to Opp'n Mem,), a
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list of Timpanogos Tribe membership eligibility requirements (Ex. F to Opp'n Mem.), and a'
Judgment issued by the Ute Tribal Court (Ex. K to Opp'n Mem.).
The Mary Meyer and Dave Montes Affidavits
In her affidavit, Mary Meyer states, among other things, that she is a member of the
Timpanogos Tribe and presently is its Chief Executive Officer. (Meyer Aff. Yl 2-3.) She also
makes the following assertion: "I descend from Shoshonean and Northern Paiute Ancestors. I
am not Ute. I have no Ute Indian blood, nor have I ever been enrolled with the Ute Indian Tribe,
a Federal Corporation." (Id. f 8.) Similarly, Dave Montes, in his affidavit, states that he is a
Timpanogos Indian rather than a Ute, that he is a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, that he has
never been a Ute Tribal member, that his children, mother, grandfather Leo Pritchett, and great
grandfather Chief Tabby were never Ute Tribal members, that the Uintah Valley Reservation has
always been his home, and that his great grandfather "spent most of his time in the Rock Creek
area and always claimed the Wasatch Front as his home." (Montes Aff. ff 1,3-5, 7, 8-9.)
Ms. Meyer's and Mr. Montes' personal statements offer nothing more than anecdotal
information and are not relevant to the questions facing the court, particularly the question of
whether the Timpanogos band of Indians merged with th$ Ute Indian Tribe, thereby ceasing to
exist as an independent entity. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F,3d
543, 548 (10th Cir. 2001):
[The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians' ("UTSI")] argument assumes the very
factual issue at the heart of this litigation. UTSI can only prevail on its contention
if we accept its bare assertion that it is the present-day embodiment of the
Shawnee Tribe. The only evidence even arguably offered by UTSI to support this
proposition is the fact that UTSI is based on land patented to Mr. Oyler's ancestor
by the Treaty. While this fact may establish that Mr. Oyler's ancestor was a
member of the Shawnee tribe and that Mr. Oyler is therefore a descendant of a
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tribal member, it says nothing about whether UTSI has maintained its identity
with the Shawnee tribe and has continued to exercise that tribe's sovereign
authority up to the present day.
Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
The Utah State Tax Commission Proceeding
Plaintiff raises a collateral estoppel argument when it relies on documents in the April 27,
2000 Utah State Tax Commission case of Marv Mever v. Customer Serv. Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n (Appeal No. 98-1181), to support its position. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,10,12,
14,17-22; Ex. C to PL's Opp'n Mem (Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission); Ex. D to
PL's Opp'n Mem. (State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Memorandum in tax proceeding).) According to
Plaintiff,
The Timpanogos Tribe was historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe
and was of Shoshone [descent]
Moreover, recently in the case of Meyer v.
Utah State Tax Comm Vz,... the State of Utah and the Utah Tax Commission
recognized Mary Meyer, the Chief Executive Officer of the Timpanogos Tribe, as
"a member of the San Pitch [B]and of Timpanogos [T]ribe of Snake Indians[,]"
"an Indian member of the Shoshone Nation[,]" and "not of Ute ancestry[.]"
.. .This recognition is prima facie evidence of the Plaintiffs distinct identity
[today].
(PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).) In the Mever case, the issue was whether
Ms. Meyer was exempt from the requirement to pay property taxes on her car because she was an
Indian (non-Ute) living on the Reservation.
Plaintiffs collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive here for a number of reasons.
First, the Ute Tribe was not a party to the litigation, so at a minimum, only one of two
Defendants would, in theory, be collaterally estopped.
Second, the issue of Ms. Meyer's ancestry was not actually litigated. That is, the State of
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Utah had no reason to dispute Ms. Meyer's assertion that she is not a Ute, because her assertion
meant that the State would prevail on its claim for property tax from a non-tribal member. As
Defendants note, "Ms. Meyer could have said she was of any ethnicity, heritage, or group other
than Ute and the State would have had no reason to contest her claim." (Defs.' Reply Mem. at
9.) Accordingly, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs overly broad statement that determination of
"Ms. Meyer's ancestry [as a Shoshone] was necessary to the Utah State Tax Commission's
judgment." (gee PL's Opp'n Mem. at 20.)
Third, the issue actually litigated in the tax commission case was "whether the state may
tax personal property of an Indian who lives on a reservation, but is not an enrolled member of
the governing tribe." (Utah State Tax Comm'n Final Decision at 6 (Ex. C to PL's Opp'n
Mem.).) The Mever decision assumes the truth of the proposition being challenged by the
Plaintiff in this matter, namely that the Ute Tribe is the exclusive governing tribe of the
Reservation. (See 14 at 5-7; see also State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Mem. in Meyer at 2 ("The Ute
Tribe is the governing Tribe over the lands of the Ute Indian Reservation."") (attached as Ex. D to
PL's Opp'n Mem.)) The Utah State Tax Commission administrative court did not decide the
same issue facing the court today.
Finally, as noted by the Defendants, "the Commission would not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the Timpanogos' existence." See, e.g.. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195,
1203 (10th Cir. 2002) f i t is rudimentary that 'Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be
extinguished only with federal consent' and that the termination of the protection that federal
law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal
law.'") (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1979)).
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The 1776 Dotninguez-Escalante Journal, the 1861 Executive Order,
1863 Map of Shoshone Territory, and the Unratified 1865 Spanish
Fork Treaty
Plaintiff cites to these historical documents (Exs. G, H,1, and L to PL's Opp'n Mem.) to
support its position that the Timpanogos Indians historically were recognized as a separate and
distinct tribe of Shoshone descent that was induced to inhabit (and did inhabit) the area which
became known as the Reservation. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-10,12-14,26.) The Plaintiff
claims that these documents establish its members' aboriginal rights and that such aboriginal
rights are superior to the Ute Tribe's rights and jurisdiction.
The excerpt from the Dominguez-Escalante Journal notes the characteristics and location
of the Timpanogos band of Indians in what was then Utah Territory. {Journal Excerpt (Ex, G to
PL's Opp'n Mem.),) Plaintiff cites to this for the proposition that the "Timpanogos Tribe was
historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe and was of Shoshone [descent]." (PL's
Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,12-13.) But the excerpt from the Journal makes no mention of Shoshone
Indians. Moreover, it is not disputed that a separate Timpanogos band existed in 1776. (See
Defs.' Reply Mem. at 5-6.) This piece of evidence does nothing to contradict the Defendants'
evidence that the Timpanogos band merged into the Uintah Ute band of Indians in 1865 and
ceased to maintain an identity independent of the Ute Tribe.
The 1861 Executive Order (later approved by an 1864 Act of Congress) set aside a
reservation in the Uintah Valley "for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such
of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as may be induced to inhabit the same."
(Oct. 3,1861 Exec. Order (Ex. H to Pi's Opp'n Mem.); Act of May 5,1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63,
§ 2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the unremarkable proposition that the Uintah Valley
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Reservation was set aside as an Indian reservation by President Lincoln. (PL's Opp'n Mem. at
13.) Plaintiff then makes the inference, in conjunction with citations to the 1776 Journal and an
unratified 1865 treaty (discussed below), that "it is undisputed and historically documented that
the Timpanogos Tribe constituted one of the 'different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory'
for whom the Uintah Reservation was established/* (Id at 26.) At most, giving the Plaintiff
benefit of the doubt, this tends to show that the Reservation was established for more than one
tribe, all of which would co-exist and have equal rights on the Reservation. Even if Plaintiff is
arguing that it be allowed to "co-exist" with the Ute Tribe on the Reservation, it ignores later
historical events which suggest that the Utes were the only Indians for whom the reservation was
set aside. For example, under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18,1934,48 Stat. 984, the
current Ute Tribe was formed by combining the Uintah, White River, and Uncompahgre bands of
Ute Indians in 1936, Also, in 1937, the Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation were established with approval of the United States. See also
Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States. 28 Fed. CL 768, 784-85 (Fed. CL 1993) (stating that
"aboriginal title provides a given tribe with rights as against all except the sovereign" and "a tribe
must prove exclusive possession of a parcel.... [M]ixed use of a given parcel 'precludes the
establishment of any aboriginal title'").
The 1863 map cited by Plaintiff purports to show Shoshone territory in Utah. Plaintiff
relies on it to show that Shoshone Territory included the land where the Reservation was
established. But, in the court opinion to which it was attached as an exhibit, the court notes that
the drawn boundaries were approximate. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United
States, 95 Ct. CL 642 (Ct CL 1942). And the purpose of the 1863 treaties between the Shoshone
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and the United States, for which the map was originally drawn, was to create peaceful relations
between the tribe and the government, not to negotiate or establish any right or title to the
territory indicated on the map.
[T]he information [gathered by the agents of the government] as to the locations
of various bands of these Indians and the area in which they lived and over which
they roamed and hunted... was general in character and indefinite as to
boundaries of specific areas and, also, as to specific bands or individual Indians of
specific tribes
The treaties [with the Shoshone] were intended to be, and we
think they are, treaties of peace and amity because the Government had very little
reliable information as to the territory actually occupied by these [Shoshone]
Indians.
Id. A map of approximate boundaries, by itself or in conjunction with the rest of Plaintiff s
evidence, is simply not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact in this case.
The Plaintiff also cites to the unratified 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty "with the Utah,
Yampah Ute, Pah-Vant, Sanpete Ute, Tim-P-Nogs and Cum-Nn>Bah Bands of the Utah
Indians." (Treaty (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) at 1 (emphasis added).) The Treaty provides in
relevant part that the Timpanogos were a band of Indians in Utah Territory who were induced to
"remove to and settle upon" the reservation described as "the entire valley of the Uintah River
within Utah Territory extending on both sides of said river to the crest of the first range of
contiguous mountains on each side." (Id at 1-2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the
proposition that the Timpanogos Band was distinct and did not merge with the Utes, because, it
appears, the Timpanogos Band was represented by a separate signatory to the treaty. Aside from
the fact that the treaty was never ratified (the Senate rejected it in 1869 so it is not a binding
document), it also contains language that contemplates giving the group of bands as one entity
exclusive use and occupation rights of a single piece of land. Specifically, the Treaty provides
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that one undivided tract of land is "reserved for the exclusive use and occupation of the said
tribes," (Treaty art. II (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem,) (emphasis added).) This language is
inconsistent with the Timpanogos Tribe's contention that the Reservation was set aside for it, not
for the Ute Tribe. (See> e.g.. Am. CompL 112.)
Timpanogos Tribe Eligibility Requirements and the 1979 Ute Tribal
Council Decision
The fact that a modern day entity calling itself Timpanogos Tribe maintains the eligibility
requirements set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit F does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The court must look to historical evidence to make its determination.
In the 1979 Ute Tribal Council decision (attached as Exhibit K to PL's Opp'n Mem.), the
Ute Tribal Council decided that certain individuals, some of whom were apparently ancestors of
affiant Dave Montes, did not meet the requirements for Ute Tribe membership. The tribal
court's holding does not tell us anything other than the fact that certain relatives of Mr. Montes
were not members of the Ute Tribe. This does not support Plaintiff s claims. Plaintiff asks the
court to make unreasonable inferences and leap to the conclusion that because Mr. Montes and
his ancestors are not Ute, the Plaintiff, whose members include Mr. Montes, is a Shoshone tribe
in existence since aboriginal times and for whom the Reservation was set aside. The court will
not make that leap, nor will it allow a jury to do so.
In short, Plaintiff has presented nothing more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence, which
is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co,. 181
F.3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment.
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
DATED this jfcS^day of January, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge
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Addendum H

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING AND ORDER
D

:
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UINTAH C O U N ^ A H

vs.

:

JAW 2 1 2004

RICKIE L. REBER,

:

Defendant.

Case No.: 021800320

B Y J ^ ^ C T

8 ,

CLERK

DEPUTY

:

The Court has reviewed the Defendant's pleading entitled "Witness Re: Reliance Upon
Written Court Opinion, U.C.A. §76-2-304, as well as the pleadings relating to the Plaintiffs
objection to the proposed witnesses. The Defendant alleges that he was acting in reliance upon
a written interpretation of the law as contained in the following Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
cases: Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Utah. 114 F. 3d 1513; and
Timpanogos tribe v. Conway, 286 F. 3d 1195. To support his defense of ignorance or
mistake of law, Defendant proposes to call the Appellate Court Judges who wrote the opinion
of the Court in the above cases (to explain the case); a professor of law (to explain principles
of Indian law); the Uintah County Recorder (to verify the location of the offense); the Chief
Executive Officers of the "Timpanogos Tribe" (to explain the rights which the "Timpanogos
Tribe" seeks to exercise in Timpanogos v. Conway); a senior member of the Uintah Band (to
explain the history and traditions of Indians of Utah Territory and the history of litigation
involving Indians of Utah Territory); and an "Indian of Utah Territory" (to explain Indian
culture and religion and the government of the Uintah Band); an enrolled member of the
Uncompahgre Band and former member of the Ute Tribe Business Committee (to explain the
historical separate existence of Uintah Band, to explain the rights retained by the Uintah Band
and explain all relevant written laws and resolutions); and, a retired law professor (to explain
the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic evidence connecting the Uintah Bank with
Shoshone Indians).
Our Rules of Evidence indicate that "All relevant evidence is admissible . . . " Rule 402
U.R.E. "Relevant evidence" is defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. Our statutes also
provides (1) " In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the Court...(2) The jury
- - - are bound to follow the law as stated by the Court" 77-17-10(c) U.C.A. Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also mandates that the court instruct the jury in writing at
the conclusion of the evidence.
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The above witnesses are offered as witnesses concerning the Defendant's defense of
Ignorance or mistake of law under U.C.A. 76-2-34 (2)(b). That section states:
"(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no
defense to a crime unless: . . .
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actions reasonable reliance upon:
(i) The official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant
of permission by an administrative agency changed by law with responsibility for interpreting
the law in question; or of the law contained in an opinion of a Court of record or made by a
public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a Court
of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question."
Defendant has now abandoned his original claim that die permit he showed the officers
at the scene (which was issued by the "Timpanogos Tribe") was a valid license which allowed
the permittee to hunt wildlife. He now claims that, although the permit was not valid, at the
time, he reasonably believed that it was valid. Alternatively at various times, Defendant has
indicated that he was entitled to hunt without a permit issued by the State either:
(1) Because he is a descendant of a terminated Ute and has inherited hunting privileges
from his mother; or
(2) Because he was alive at the time that the Termination Proclamation was issued and
was not listed on the proclamation; and therefore has maintained rights to hunt; or
(3) Because he is an aboriginal Indian of Utah Territory who retains aboriginal hunting
rights.
In its prior order this Court has ruled that hunting and fishing rights can not be
inherited; that the Defendant's Indian status was terminated when his mother was listed on the
Termination Proclamation; and, because he is 93.75% non-Indian, he does not possess a
significant quantum of Indian blood and is not entitled to Indian status under U.S. v. Rogers,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567. It is therefore apparent to the Court that in order for the Defendant to
raise the defense of mistake of law based upon the 10th Circuit opinions, he must introduce
evidence that:
(1) He actually read the opinions or was informed of the decisions in a manner which
could support reasonable reliance (if indeed one can ever reasonably rely upon hearsay
concerning the contents of an opinion); and
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(2) The holding in at least one of the cases was either:
(A) The "Timpanogos Tribe has legal authority to issue permits to take wildlife;
or
(B) Descendants of terminated Utes, inherit their terminated parents rights to
hunt wildlife; or
(C) Children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination
Proclamation, who were not listed on the proclamation, maintain rights to hunt; or
(D) A person who is only 6.25% Indian has a significant quantum of Indian
blood under Rogers; and,
(3) He relied upon the holding in acting or failing to act; and
(4) His reliance on the holding was reasonable.
The Court has carefully read each of the cases relied upon by the Defendant.
Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway decided two narrow procedural issues: (1) Whether the Federal
District Court had jurisdiction to consider the "Timpanogos Tribe's" claims; and (2) Whether
the State of Utah was entitled to a dismissal under 12(b)(6) (Federal rules of Civil Procedure)
for failure to state a claim of action based upon immunity of the State under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Court held that the fact that the "Timpanogos Tribe" was not recognized as
an Indian Tribe by the Federal Government did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction;
and that, because the Plaintiffs only requested prospective injunctive relief, the State was not
entitled to a 12(b)(6) dismissal based upon immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah is an attempt by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
to resolve conflicts between its prior holding in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773F.2d 1087 and
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah. 510 U.S. 399. The case
addresses the issues of the boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation in light of the
foregoing decisions. No issue relative to this case was considered by the Court.
For the purpose of considering the issue of the Defendant's Indian status, the State has
indicated that it will concede that the offense occurred within Indian Country. Even assuming
that the offense occurred within Indian Country, the Court has previously ruled that the
Defendant does not have Indian status and that the Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, in order
to advance its defense the Defendant must point to language in one of the cases which would
reasonably lead the Defendant to believe one of the alternatives listed in (2) (A) through (D)
above.
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Neither of the cases which the Defendant relies upon held that: "The Timpanogos
Tribe" has legal authority to issue hunting permits; or, children of terminated Utes inherit
hunting rights; or, children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination
Proclamation retain hunting rights; or, a person who is 6.25% Indian has a significant
quantum of Indian blood under U.S. v. Rogers. Therefore, the Defendant can not advance a
defense of ignorance or mistake of law based upon either case. It would be unreasonable as a
matter of law for the Defendant to read either or both of these cases and conclude that the
"Timpanogos Tribe" had legal authority to issue a permit, or that he was entitled to hunt based
upon any of the various theories which are based upon his claimed Indian Status, or that he
had a right to hunt based upon a permit issued by the "Timpanogos Tribe".
In addition, it is apparent that the proposed testimony is not relevant to the defense of
ignorance or mistake of law and that some of the testimony is improperly offered to instruct
the jury as to the law. The defense of ignorance or mistake of law requires reasonable reliance
upon a written decision of a Court of record. The reliance can be based only on the written
opinion: "The language of Section 76-2-304 clearly and unambiguously requires a written
interpretation, by either a Court of Record or a public servant, in order for mistake of law to
be an available defense." (State v. Norton, 67 P.3d 1050 at 1053). The opinions which the
Defendant relies upon were opinions of a panel of Judges. Each opinion is what it is; the
opinion of the panel can not be added to or subtracted from through parol evidence from one
of its members. The law expressly requires that the reliance must be based on the opinion
itself not some subsequent explanation of the opinion from a panel member. Similarly, it
would be inappropriate to allow a professor of law to testify as to general principles of law
upon which Indians routinely rely. The defense is specifically tied to written opinions issued
by a Court of record, not general principles of law. The Defendant seeks to present evidence
regarding: the purpose of the Timpanogos Tribe in bringing the lawsuit and the rights they
seek to enforce; Indian history and tradition; Indian culture and religion; the separate existence
of the Uintah Band and the rights of its members; the laws and resolutions of the Uintah Band;
and the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic connection to the Shoshone Tribe; However,
none of this testimony is relevant to the written opinion upon which Defendant relies. Neither
is the testimony of Mr. Simmons concerning the location of the alleged crime.
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Based upon the above, the Court finds that the proposed testimony is not relevant
because it does not have any tendency to make it more probable or less probable that the
Defendant relied upon either 10th Circuit case. The Court will also find as a matter of law that
the Defendant could not reasonably rely upon either Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway or Ute
Indian Tribe v. Utah to advance his defense of ignorance or mistake of law.
DATED this ^fl_day of January, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNg?t>ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the Q? 1 day of January, 2004, true and correct copies of the
Ruling and Order were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. Peterson,
Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. Michael L.
Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, at 23 West Center Street, P.O.Box 486, Heber City, UT
80432.

Deputy ^lerk
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Addendum I

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
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Plaintiff,
RULING
vs.
Case No. 021800320 FS

RICKIE L. REBER.,
Defendant.

This Court has received under certification from the trial court judge the Defendant's
Motion to Disqualify.
After fully reviewing the file, and within the provisions of Rule 29(c)(2) U.R.Cr.P., the
Court finds that based upon the allegations supported by affidavit for the Motion to Disqualify
that bias and prejudice, if any, that is alleged was loiown by the affiants prior to the court's ruling
on the question of jurisdiction. Since Rule 29(c) requires the motion to disqualify to be filed at
least within 20 days of (a) the assignment of the action or hearing to the judge, (b) the appearance
of the party or the party's attorney, or (c) the date on which the moving party learns or with
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is
based are all adequately and woefully late. The parties in this case have adequately and
knowledgeably presented the arguments for determining jurisdiction when the Defendant has
claimed to be an Indian. Those matters have been adequately briefed, well argued, and the trial
court's ruling seems to be well supported in the case law.
It would seem that the Defendant has waited to disqualify the judge until almost eleven
months after this case was filed when he obtained an unfavorably ruling. Therefore, the matter
will be returned to the trial judge. The Motion to Disqualify is hereby denied.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2003.

John R. Anderson
Eighth District Court Judge

